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ABSTRACT 
A modest attempt has been made in the thesis, "Rise of 
Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: Its impact on developmental 
processes", to examine the Kashmir crisis in its historical and 
contemporary perspective and its impact on the developmental 
process in the state. The present study has been divided into five 
chapters. The first chapter gives the conceptual framework of 
terrorism, which is often used as a political weapon to weaken their 
opponents and to produce the desired results, by using terror and 
intimidating people. Seen in this perspective, terrorism bears a 
mode of action, rather a violent one. Most of the cases of terrorist 
acts that came before the security council do not aim at creating 
merely a state of terror but are intended to induce governments to 
act in a desired way or direction. It is thus used as an instrument to 
get the grievances redressed. Terrorism is not a new concept. It has 
always in existence, in one form or the other throughout the history 
of mankind. The only difference between the conventional and 
contemporary militancy lies in their modus operandi. Modem 
terrorism in most cases, is carried out by small groups with a 
particular ideology or aim that they wish to force upon others. It 
becomes more dangerous when a particular race or religious 
conmiunity becomes the target of the terrorists. The development of 
science and technology and application of remote control system 
has resulted in the use of terror on a massive scale in a refined and 
sophisticated manner, threatening the very fabric of international 
order and rights of the people. Once employed by power seeking 
guerrillas against colonial powers, it has now engulfed both the 
East and the West. Despite the universality of terrorism it lacks a 
universally accepted definition. It is described differently by 
different people. The words terrorist, militant, racist, fascist and 
imperialist are often used interchangeably, which has made the 
confusion worse, confounded. The problem with the term is that 
each individual looks from his own point of view. Often one man's 
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The terrorists glorify 
terrorism as means to achieve political objectives. Apologists for 
terrorism often attempt to counter moral objections by comparing 
their own acts of violence with those of their opponents. By making 
such a comparison, they do not see anything wrong in their actions. 
Tactically militancy and terrorism resemble each other. They both 
employ if seen from the tactical point of view kidnapping, 
hijacking, assassination, bomb blasts, suicide attacks etc. to express 
their resentment and get things done. Inspite of their similarity, they 
are not similar for in militancy, there is some cause for mobilising 
the core of the militants without alienating the public, secondly the 
cause of the militants have a sufficient degree of legitimacy in the 
public eye, the opposition and world community as well but these 
things are not necessary for terrorism. 
The second chapter covers the historical roots of the 
present crisis in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and its present 
trends. The state of Jammu and Kashmir whose foundation was laid 
by Gulab Singh, a feudatory of Sikhs for a cash payment of 75 
lakhs of rupees. Right from the Dogra Rule, the Muslim subjects, 
who formed bulk of the population, bore the heaviest brunt of the 
Dogra autocracy which was highly exploitative. The masses were 
economically backward because of jagirdari system, exploitative 
revenue system and above all a corrupt administration. The first 
fifty years of Dogra rule characterised by repression was 
responsible for disseminating in the minds of its subjects the seeds 
of resentment against its very existence. Politically suppressed and 
economically exploited, the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir 
also suffered educational backwardness. The anti-Muslim attitude 
of the Dogra Raj further added to their miseries. Disputes over 
religious places became a common thing in this period in which the 
Rulers mostly sided the minority community in the State. The pleas 
and representations of the Muslim community for their betterment 
largely went unheeded. With the transfer of power and partition of 
the subcontinent, new problems cropped up. As all the princely 
states were supposed either to join the Dominion of India or 
Dominion of Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir like 
Hyderabad and Junagadh neither joined India nor Pakistan! The 
state of Jammu and Kashmir being the Muslim populated area and 
keeping in view the strategic importance of the state for Pakistan, 
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Pakistan sent armed infilitrators to get the control of the state. The 
Maharaja feeling helpless to deal with the situation made frantic 
requests to India to help him. Nehru taking advantage of the 
situation forced him to sign the Instrument of Accession. Even the 
Viceroy Lord Mountbaten while signing the instrument of 
Accession introduced a provision that the wishes of the people 
should be ascertained after normalcy is restored in the valley. 
Meanwhile India lodged a complaint in the U.N. which also 
favoured a plebiscite in the State. Initially India agreed to hold the 
plebiscite,but nothing concrete emerged and the tension between 
the two countries escalated resulting into two wars and Kashmir 
became a permanent irritant between India and Pakistan. The 
various efforts to resolve the issue like Ae Tashkent Agreement, 
Simla Agreement failed to make dent in the bi-lateral relations. The 
accession was followed by Delhi Agreement between Sheikh 
Abdullah and Nehru whereby autonomy was guaranteed to the state 
by providing that the Parliament shall not frame laws for the State 
without the consent of the State Assembly except in the areas of 
defence,extemal affairs and communication The Agreement also 
recognised the State flag, common citizenship and spelt out the 
mode of appointment of the head of the State. It also formalized the 
Union State financial arrangements. Ironically both the Instrument 
of Accession and Delhi Agreement were fragrantly violated and 
laws were passed by the Union infringing tiie Autonomy of the 
State. Lop sided politics and politics of convenience and 
manipulation on the part of New Delhi towards Kashmir and 
repeated rigging of elections coupled with unprincipled 
compromises created a dismal mosaic of national and secular life in 
the state. For example right from the time of Accession in 1947, 
successive Governments in New Delhi have been guilty of 
undemocratic policies. Maharaja himself was forced into exile in 
1949, Sheikh Abdullah was thrown into jail, Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammad was uncermoniously dismissed and jailed, and Syed 
Mir Qasim was forced to step down and make way for the 
undemocratic return of the Sheikh under the 1975 Accord with Mrs. 
Gandhi. Just a few years latter, the Sheikh's son was also thrown 
out of power. Son in law of the Sheikh was tried and dumped into 
Jhelum only after twenty months. As a result,firustration and a sense 
of alienation among the people was writ large on the people in the 
valley. Gradually and unconsciously the seeds of militancy were 
sown which remained, by and large dormant till the elections of 
1987, which were reported to have been rigged on a massive scale 
shattering the hopes and aspirations of the people and affecting the 
credibility of the Government. The youth who had actively 
participated in these elections from Muslim United Front lost all 
hopes of access to political offices through peaceful and democratic 
methods. Realising the futility of the state-sponsored elections, they 
decided to wage an armed struggle against flie authority which in 
their opinion has no legitimacy to rule over them. With this 
objective, many of them crossed over the border for moral and 
material support. Pakistan, taking advantage of the situation, 
provided them with arms and anmiunitions. This is corroborated by 
the fact that during the last one decade, the security forces 
recovered weapons worth 30 crores. The arms seized by army alone 
include 12155 AK assault rifles, 755 machine guns, 623 rocket 
projectile guns (RPGs) 195 snipper rifles, 3975 pistol/revolvers, 25 
motors, 1160 radio sets besides huge quantities of explosives. It 
amounts to 75% of the total arms seized in the Kashmir valley so 
far. Thousands of people were killed and thousands are languishing 
in jails under various emergency legislations such as 
TADA,Disturbed Areas Act, Special Powers Act, Public Safety Act. 
Militancy is no longer confined to the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir but has assumed transnational dimensions posing a threat 
to the national and international order. Hence the need to fight it at 
state, national and international level is an imperative. The third 
chapter of this thesis makes a study of the measures adopted to 
combat militancy both at global level as well as in the state of 
Janrniu and Kashmir. There have been several attempts to deal with 
terrorism at a global level. In 1937, the League of Nations drafted 
two Conventions addressing the problem of militancy but they 
failed to make any headway because only 13 States ratified these 
conventions. Its work was carried out by U.N. The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights strictly prohibit the inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment of a person. The U.N. 
Convention on Genocide further stressed human dignity irrespective 
of race, religion or nationality. On the prevention and punishment 
of crimes against the internationally protected persons, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted a convention in 1973. The 1970 Hague 
Convention requires signatories either to extradite apprehended 
hijackers to their country of origin, or to prosecute them under the 
judicial code of their native state. The Montreal Convention of 
1971 extended the scope of international law to encompass 
sabotage and attacks on airports and ground aircrafts. Substantial 
progress has been made in the direction to achieve international co-
operation in western Europe. Since 1976, a machinery for 
discussion and multilateral co-operation has been developed by the 
European Union Ministers of the Interior and the police forces and 
intelligence services of the member states. This Union provides a 
mechanism for developing informal collaboration and exchange of 
information between national police and intelligence officials. At 
the meeting of G-7 States in June 1995, political leaders called for 
a special Counter Terrorism Conference of Ministries to prevent use 
of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by terrorists. In the 
wake of assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Pitzhak Rabin 
by Jewish extremist in November, 1996 and Hamas Sucide 
bombings against Israel in 1996, provided the catalyst for further 
strengthening international co-operation. The second part of this 
chapter deals with the measures taken by the Government to combat 
militancy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Among them, the 
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deployment of security forces, fencing of border, enactment of 
Emergency legislation, holding of parliamentary and state 
assembl/ elections,creation of counterinsurgent groups, 
reinforcement of police force, release of Hurriyat leaders and cease 
fire initiative, were discussed. 
The fourth chapter deals with the impact of militancy on 
developmental processes in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Militancy, whatever be its form or manifestation, is bound to 
produce harmful effects on the economy. With militancy hovering 
over the valley since 1989, the Government had to deploy the 
security forces on a massive scale causing huge expenditure which 
could have been spent on eradication of poverty and 
unemployment. The blasts and encounters led to a heavy losses of 
lives and property and generated a sense of insecurity all over the 
valley. The frequent bandhs and imposition of curfew paralysed the 
economic and commercial activities in the state. The bomb blasts 
caused destruction of property worth crores of rupees. Kashmir 
once known for its flourishing tourism industry,was rendered fear 
haunted place keeping the tourists away from visting the valley 
incurring heavy losses. The Apple industry too met the same fate. 
The business in corporations and public undertakings came to a 
standstill. Forestry, one of the main source of income for the state, 
too was badly affected. The net result was, a severe financial crisis 
in the state. The frequent disruption of law and order punctuated by 
violent incidents had a demoralising impact on the administration. 
As a result, all developmental programmes and projects were swept 
under the carpet. 
The conclusion tries to highlight a few options for the 
resolution of the Kashmir problem. The policy of discrimination, 
pursued over decades and lack of timely action to redress the 
grievances of the people, has landed the state in the present mess. 
Suppression of rights and exploitation of people over years, 
adhocism, political cliches and empty promises have done 
irrepairable damage to the State. What is therefore required is a 
sober approach,free from political overtones, to the problem. The 
problems and grievances of the people have to be identified the 
lapses on the part of the government in addressing to these 
problems ought to be examined in the right perspective. 
Mobilisation of public opinion in favour of government's policies, 
through persuasion rather than coercion will go a long way in 
building up confidence among people. The ceasefire declared by 
the Government of India can certainly lead to good days, if 
implemented in its true spirit by entering into a dialogue with 
different shades of opinion in the valley. The process has to move 
forward. Pakistan's support is equally necessary. But judging from 
incidents like the incursion of Pakistan surveillence planes send 
different messages. Mere declaration of ceasefire will not end 
militancy and terrorism.lt only expresses the futility of military 
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option and look forward to political solution. The Hurriyat 
Conference which is prepared for talks despite opposition and 
threats from the hardliners should be encouraged and the process 
should not be bogged down in futile arguments over passports. 
There is nothing wrong if the hardliners and the pro-Pakistani 
leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Bhatt are also 
associated with the peace talks. The focus should be on restoring 
back normalcy in the State even if it involves the association of the 
Y} 
hardliners. It is only then that the priestiae glory can be restored 
back in the once peace loving valley. 

RISE OF A/lfLITAMCY IN JAMMU AMD KASHMIR 
ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES 
T H E S I S 
SUBMITTED POR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Bottor of $I)ilO£;opI)p 
Political Science 
BY 
QOUSAR HABIB 
Under th« Supervision of 
Prof. Mohammad Murtaza Khan 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
2001 
d<i 
•\ 
>.fa-
YOi^lAT 53 
iv3G i^C TOA^fVlf a i 
T5571 
Bli^ 
f!fc:ft. 
eu leaie o 
JL^oi^ing ILfounger luro'lker 
cL^at e id basmir clLabib 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE /
Chainnanaiamber : 401720 
Internal Chamber : 364 
CMRce . 365 I ( 
Dated: 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that Jli^, doudOfc MaSiB^ has completed his thesis 
entitled "Rise of Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir : Its Impact on 
Developmental Processes" under my supervision and is, in my opinion, 
suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in Political Science of the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. 
Prof. M.Murtaza Khan 
(Supervisor) 
CONTENTS 
Page Nos. 
Preface i - iii 
Chapter 1 Terrorism : The Conceptual 
Framework 1 - 25 
Chapter 11 Rise of Militancy in Jammu and 
Kashmir - Historical Background 
and Contemporary Trends 26 - 75 
Chapter III Measures taken to combat 
Militancy 76- 105 
Chapter IV Impact of Militancy on 
Developmental Processes 106-165 
Chapter V Conclusion 166-180 
Bibliography 181-191 
Appendices 192-223 
PREFACE 
The thesis is a modest attempt to study the impact of 
militancy on development and developmental processes in the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir. The State, for the past two decades, 
presents a gloomy picture, making the lives of innocent citizens 
extremely unsafe due to violence and frequent resort to militant and 
terrorist acts. The tragedy of contemporaiy era has been that even 
pure and simple terrorist acts are given respectability under the garb 
of liberation movements. One man's terrorist is often another man's 
freedom fighter. It is this mischievous interpretation that has made 
the definition of terrorism difficult. Often, there is also a confusion 
between terrorism and state terrorism. The latter, be it in the form 
of fake encounters, custodial killings, political murders, reign of 
terror by security forces, has made the task of definition further 
difficult. State terrorism is no answer to terrorism by groups. The 
State of Jammu and Kashmir presents an excellent mixture of these 
two brands of terrorism and the innocent citizens, in the process, 
are its worst victims. 
Terrorism, however, is not a new phenomenon, nor it is 
the exclusive problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It has a 
long and chequered histoiy with its roots in ancient civilisations. 
What is new, is the refinement and precision with which 
contemporary terrorist acts are executed. It is no longer confined to 
jungles and deserts, it has spread its tentacles to state 
establishments and civilian areas. It is this new trend that is 
alarming and more disturbing. Militancy and terrorism, it ought to 
be remembered do not emerge like rabbits out of magician's box. It 
is the product of exploitation, suppression and denial of rights. The 
seeds of militancy were unconsciously sown during the Dogra rule 
in the State. As Ted Robert Gur in his 'Why Men Rebel', rightly 
argued that political violence is a consequence of a significant gap 
between the value expectations of a given group and the value 
capabilities of the group. This explains the current wave of 
militancy in Kashmir. Over the years, right from independence, the 
leadership betrayed the citizens by pursuing their own narrow and 
selfish political interests. Politics of convenience has been the hall 
mark of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether it was the 
Congress, the National Conference or other seasonal political 
groups. The Congress, however, is the biggest beneficiary. 
It is these issues that form the focus of discussion in the 
present thesis. The first chapter is an overview of the conceptual 
framework of militancy in historical retrospect. The second chapter 
is an attempt to study the rise of rttilitancy in the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir and its contemporary trends. The third chapter gives 
an account of the measures undertaken to combat militancy. It also 
tries to analyse the efforts at international level to address the 
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problem of militancy and terrorism. The fourth chapter highlights 
the impact of militancy on the developmental processes in the State. 
An attempt is made to suggest various options in the conclusion, 
for the resolution of the crisis. The present efforts of restoring 
normalcy through the Ceasefire by the Government of India has 
also been discussed. 
I am deeply indebted to Professor Mohammad Murtaza 
Khan, my supervisor, guide and teacher, for his help and assistance 
in the completion of the present work. My other teachers in the 
Department also deserve my gratitude. 1 extend my thanks to all my 
friends for their encouragement and cooperation.''! shall be failing 
in my duty, if I do not acknowledge the moral and financial support 
of my parents, without which, the present work would not have 
seen the light of the dawn. In all humility, I am grateful to the 
Almighty for His Divine blessings and guidance at every stage of 
my life. 
(QOU 

Chapter 1 
TERRORISM: The Conceptual Framework 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been a recurring 
theme in the history of mankind. It has always been in existence in 
one form or the other throughout the Course of civilization. Where 
one side believed that the threat of violence might intimidate a foe 
into submission, it usually did not hesitate to use such threats. 
Terrorism in the ancient world often did not demonstrate all the 
aspects that go to make up the phenomenon of modern terrorism. 
Many examples from ancient to medieval history of what, broadly 
defined, might be termed terrorism, relate more to the use of terror 
as an instrument of policy. 
Historical sources as old as the Bible record many instances 
of terror being used to achieve an objective. The book of Joshua 
states that the Israelites 'utterly destroyed all that was in the city 
(Jaricho), both men and women, young and old and ox and sheep with 
the edge of the sword'. This massacre of a city after it had fallen to 
an army after a long seizes was typical of warfare of this time and for 
centuries to come. If a besieged town continues to resist attempts to 
capture it, the attackers after successfully overcoming it would put 
all its inhabitants to the sword. This slaughter served specifically to 
frighten neighbouring peoples into early submission when their turn 
came to be under attack. 
Another theme that stands out strongly in looking at the history 
of terrorism up to 1945 is the extent to which terror became easier 
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to use when the group being attacked was something separate-either 
in terms of race, ideology or religion. Being able to demonize or to 
dehumanize, their enemy makes it easier for the group using terror to 
inflict horrors on them. Demonization and dehumanization of 
enemies reached new levels during the Nazis. The word terrorism 
was coined in the guillotine days of the French Revolution', but the 
practice is much older. Terrorism dates back to the bloody 
assassinations of the ancient Greeks and Romans and to the barbaric 
customs such as suspending people over fires for not paying their 
taxes. Few parts of the world have escaped the brutalities and the 
climate of fear that terrorism creates. Among many examples, there 
were religious murder cults in the Middle East, massacres during the 
American Indian resistance, and Stalin's Purges in Russia, when some 
20 million people died at his hands to make sure that those still alive 
were cowed into submission. Terrorism has several manifestations, 
it can be initiated by the state in the form of fake encounters, by 
dedicated ideological groups, by inter societal clashes etc. 
Examples of the terror used by the state range from Imperial 
Rome to Stalins' Purges in the Soviet Union. Both these examples 
demonstrate how a ruling class, a vocal minority can cow down a 
silent majority, to enlist their support and obedience. The most 
famous introduction of terror by a state was by that of the committee 
of Public safety in 1794. Under pressure from a European wide 
coalition and having to deal with a series of revolts within France, the 
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revolutionaries decided that they would terrorize their own 
population into obedience. The results were undeniably successful. 
The French armies defeated their enemies both on the frontiers and 
also within France. 
The state terror has in turn produced theories that justify use 
of any means including terror to resist tyrants. Such ideas 
(tyrannicide') were put forward in Ancient Greece and in the later 
Roman Republic, the most famous example being the assassination 
of Julius Czar. 1,800 years latter, the Russian anarchist terrorists 
cited ideals of tyranicide in their attempts to murder the Czar^. 
Fear and terror are basically the foundations of warfare. But it 
is also used to threaten civilians. An obvious example of terror 
against civilians was in medieval siege warfare. Here there were 
commonly understood rules about how long fortified places could 
resist before the inhabitants risked massacre. Similarly, the Mongols 
made it clear to their enemies that they would exact a Savage 
vengeance if there was any resistance at all. During World War I, the 
German threats against civilians in the territories they had occupied 
were more covert, an approach perhaps influenced by German 
policies towards subject population in their colonies. 
Modern terrorism on the contrary, in most cases, is carried 
out by small group with a particular ideology or aim that they wish to 
force upon others. Again, there are examples of this throughout 
history. During the Middle Ages, the Sect known as the Assassins in 
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the Middle East, representing a particular Schism within Islam used 
selective assassination of enemy leaders. The anarchists of the late 
nineteenth century also used terror for their ends. Such methods were 
again adopted by various nationalist groups in the early twentieth 
century, such as the Serbs who assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand 
in Sarajevo in 1914. 
The use of terror policies may have taken most, lives however, 
in conflicts between different societies or different views of society 
where two societies clashed, especially when they were at different 
levels of technological development, then terror was common. A 
typical example was in North America, where terror was used by both 
sides in the wars between the European settlers and the Indian tribes 
.The tide of European colonization across the world during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also saw the use of terror. 
Massacre was used to terrify and subdue whole populations, and in 
retaliation by those being conquered. 
The development of technology in the 2000 years up to 
1945 undoubtedly has made the implementation of termor on a 
massive scale more achievable, thereby threatening the very fabric of 
international order and rights of the people. 
Terrorism once employed by power seeking guerrillas 
against colonial powers in ' national liberation' conflicts in Africa 
and Asia in the 1950's and early 1960's, has catapulted out of the 
jungles and deserts into the cultural cities of the east and west and 
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has been growing at an alarming rate. In 1971 for example, there were 
279 separate terrorist acts, including bombings, murders, hostage 
takings and kidnappings. By 1980 that figure had grown to 1,709, 
besides 379 in 1986 in Punjabi These instances include such acts 
as the mass murder that took place at the Lord Airport in 1972,the 
kidnapping and assassination of the Italian Premier Aldo-Moro in 
1978, and the 1985 bombing of an Air-Indian Jumbo-Jet by the Sikh 
terrorists that crashed into the Atlantic off the Irish Coast killing all 
329 people on board. 
In the recent past, an incident revealed in the clash of two very 
different cultures Soviet and American, on the propriety of resort to 
violence. A political and ethical gulf was never more clearly 
delineated than in the world reaction to the deliberate Soviet 
shooting down of a Korean Airline with 269 passenger a broad"*. 
Revolutionary violence and guerrilla wars have spread to every 
continent in the past decade. In 1985, Asia accounted for five percent 
of international terrorist activities worldwide. The number of 
international terrorist attacks in the region rose from 27 in 1984 to 
41 in 1985, but overall terrorism in Asia remained predominantly 
domestic in nature with Sikh violence being an exception. Several 
terrorist groups emerged in late 1984 like Sri Lanka's Tamils, 
Pakistan's Al Zulfikar and Japan's Chukaku-ha were, for the most 
part, quiescent during 1985'. 
Chapter I 
The terrible experience of World War I set the scene for 
modern terrorism in two major ways. First, during this bitterly fought 
conflict, the notion emerged that civilians could be legitimate targets 
of violence and terror. Second, the war also set the scene in the way 
that it opened up much of Asia for nationalist and often communist 
revolution. The example of revolution in Asia, particularly the 
example of China, then became very important for the rest of the 
world, as colonies crumbled and newly independent countries 
emerged*^. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were many nationalist struggles 
in the Afro-Asian world to liberate themselves from colonialism. 
The French, for example, faced bloody anti-colonial conflict in 
Algeria and Indo-China, while the British faced the Mau-Mau revolt 
in Kenya and communist insurrection in Malaya. Other European 
nations also faced such revolts. The Dutch fought a war in what is 
now Indonesia. These wars of nationalist liberation threw up a variety 
of theories and justifications for the use of what we would describe 
as terror tactics within the context of a more general armed struggle. 
Terrorism, therefore, was usually one method used in a wider 
insurgency movement. Some of the theories justifying terror tactics 
were propounded in the nineteenth century, and were part of the more 
general revolutionary theories, often connected to Marxism. Such 
theories did influence, to some degree, the behaviour and strategies 
used by insurgent movements during the struggles of decolonization. 
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As these anti-colonial campaigns progressed, however 
contemporary theorists added to the mixture, showing how the use of 
violence could be justified and how it could be used most effectively. 
Some of the leaders of these anti-colonial struggles produced 
theories based on their experiences. They provided the much-needed 
feed back providing a balance between theory and practice of the 
phenomenon of terrorism. The struggles of decolonization also 
influenced later terrorism in the sense that they provided the 
necessary paraphernalia in the form of tactics and the strategies. The 
terrorist campaigns that sprung up in the 1960s and 1970s, many of 
which are still active, learned a great deal from these earlier anti-
colonial struggles. Science and technology made it more 
sophisticated and more deadly. 
Detonation 
In the aftermath of the World War 11, a series of bitter wars 
erupted across the globe. Most were fought between the indigenous 
nationalists and the European colonial powers that had conquered 
large parts of the world in the 19'\ Century. These wars saw the 
widespread use of terror by both sides. The experience of these 
colonies during world war II was the catalyst that triggered these 
wars of decolonization. In some conflicts, as in Malaya and Indo-
China, the colonial powers had previously armed the guerrillas to 
fight the Japanese. 
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In one exceptional case, however that of India, terror had been 
used by nationalists long before world war II. Many Indian soldiers 
had served the British army in World war I. The experience of these 
Indian soldiers dispelled the myth that the European powers were 
invincible and superior. In the 1920s and 1930s, some Indian 
nationalists, wishing to oust the British colonialists and establish 
self rule, were prepared to use terror to achieve their aims. 
The colonial experience itself had also put pressure on some 
societies. In Kenya, for example, problems of land ownership among 
the Kikuya fostered the explosive social conditions that led to Mau-
Mau terrorism. However, the racism of the white troops maintaining 
order led to reprisals that fuelled the spiral atrocities. 
The most brutal acts of terrorism were witnessed in countries 
where the colonial power was determined not to withdraw. There was 
strong resistance to the nationalists. In Algeria, for example, the 
existence of the colons, a large population of white settlers, made 
the French withdrawal impossible. The war in Algeria saw widespread 
terror used by both sides, and culminated in a bombing campaign by 
right wing extremists determined to prevent French withdrawal'. 
The decolonization struggles were lengthy and vicious. France 
took eight years to crush nationalists in Algeria, by which time 
France was close to civil war. The struggle in Zimbabwe, then called 
Rhodesia, was prolonged because the country had become an 
independent state run by white settlers. In Zimbabwe, terrorists led 
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their campaign against a white government that considered itself 
indigenous, rather than against a foreign European power. 
In many decolonization campaigns, the nationalists did not 
direct terrorism solely at Europeans. They also targeted local people 
who were collaborating with the colonial regime. In Malaysia and 
Portugal's African colonies, the campaigns were rural-based, 
targeted at planters and white settlers living in isolated areas. In 
Namibia, the terrorism was both urban and rural based. Although 
Namibia was not ruled by European power, South Africa was 
governing the country as a mandate of the League of Nations. South 
Africa defied UN instructions to leave Namibia, leading to a vicious 
guerrilla war. The success differed in the various campaigns of 
decolonization. In Cyprus, terrorism had much impact, but was less 
influential in Malaya. But all colonies achieved their independence 
eventually. 
Terrorism: The conceptual framework 
The word terrorism was coined in the guillotine days of 
the French revolution. The word terrorism has been described 
differently by different people. It lacks a cut and dried definition. 
The words terrorist, militant, racist, fascist and imperialist are often 
used inter-changeably, which often makes the confusion worse 
confounded. The problem with the term is that each individual looks 
from his point of view and from his own perceptions. Thus often one 
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The use of 
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terrorism for political objectives has become more common than 
ever. As it is commonly understood that ' the purpose of terrorism is 
to produce terror and instill fear among their opponents'^. The 
Chinese proverb ' Kill one, frighten ten thousand', correctly 
underlines the purpose of terrorism. It is an organized system of 
intimidation.^ 
The phenomenon of terrorism can thus be defined as a strategy 
whereby violence is used to produce certain effects in a group of 
people for political ends. One of the effects of such a strategy is 
often fear'". Terrorism is the strategy of the weak. The process 
starts with a man or a group fired by a political objective which can 
not be achieved through negotiations, conventional means of 
persuasion or the democratic process. The opposition may be too 
well entrenched or too powerful. So the essence of terrorism is to 
sow fear, to make heroes out of murders" . 
Etymologists discover the roots of the English word 
Terrorisn? in the French expression 'Terrorist^ which gained 
currency during the revolutionary period in France between 1781 and 
] 79512 ji^jg association with the Jacobin regime and the guillotine 
highlights what is recognized in the literature as state terrorism, 
which IS the utilization of extreme violence by the state against its 
adversaries'-*. 
Terror and violence are resorted to intimidate and subjugate, 
the entire population or a section of it. It is often used as a political 
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weapon to weaken their opponents and to produce the desired results. 
Seen in this prospective, terrorism bears a mode of action, rather a 
violent one. Political violence is consequence of a significant gap 
between the value expectations of a given group of people and their 
value capabilities''*. Creating fear it aims at overthrowing an existing 
government by violent means. Terrorists attempt to paralyse both the 
administrative arm of a government and its will to govern by attacking 
the civil administration, economy, judiciary and other governmental 
institutions and innocent civilians" . 
The concept of terrorism according the Encyclopedia, makes 
it a " method of combat in the struggle between social groups and 
forces" rather than a struggle between individuals. The victims stand 
as "representatives of social groups or of systems of groups". The 
"Publicity value the terrorists get" is the cardinal point in the strategy 
of terrorism. The reigning government and the masses of the 
population are being given notice that "constituted authority is no 
longer safely entrenched and unchallenged"."^ 
A group of scholars, keeping in view the contemporary trends, 
attempted to define terrorism, after analyzing its various 
manifestations in 1984. The endeavour ultimately saw the light of the 
dawn in 1988 and it was agreed that" terrorism is an anxiety inspiring 
method of repeated violent action employed by (semi -) clandestine 
individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, for criminal or 
political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct 
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targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human 
victims of violence are chosen randomly or selectively from a target 
population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-
based communication processes between terrorists, victims and main 
target, turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands or a target 
of attention, depending upon whether intimidation, coercion or 
propaganda is primarily sought.'^ 
Although the term terrorism is very difficult to define yet in 
1973 the Convention on Terrorism described it as 'criminal acts 
directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of 
terror in the minds of particular persons or group of persons or the 
general public.'" But most of the cases of the terrorist acts that come 
before the Security Council do not aim at creating merely a state of 
terror but are intended to induce government to act in a particular 
way, for example, release of prisoners. It is used as an instrument to 
get the grievances redressed. Acts of terrorism often, but not 
invariably, are directed against innocent, as a means of exerting 
pressure on the powers that be. 
Brain Jenkins, one of the pioneers of empirical research on 
terrorism, noted in 1992 that a broad consensus on the meaning of 
terrorism is emerging without international agreement on the precise 
definition. The British government was the first to provide legal 
definition that distinguishes a terrorist act from a criminal act. It was 
laid down that ' for the purpose of legislation, terrorism is the use of 
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violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the 
public in fear.''^ The definition covers a wide area and can be 
interpreted to include conventional as well as nuclear strikes, The 
1975 European TREVI further expounded terrorism as the use or the 
threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons, of violence to effect 
political aims^". In the same view in 1985, the West German Office 
For the Protection of the Constitution stated that terrorism is the 
enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended 
to be achieved by assaults on the lives and property of other persons 
by means of severe crimes as detailed in article 129(a), section 1 of 
the Penal Code (murder homicide, extortionist, kidnappings, arson, 
blasts etc.), or by means of other acts of violence which serve as 
preparation for such criminal acts.^' The Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) in 1976, defined, it as ' the threat or use of violence for 
political purposes, when such action is intended to influence the 
attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate 
victims, and that its ramifications transcend national boundaries ( as 
a result of nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, the identity 
of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives or the 
mechanics of its resolution. However, over the years, the wording of 
CIA definitions has fluctuated. In 1980, for instance, terrorism was 
defined as the threat or use of violence for political purposes by 
individuals or groups whether acting for, or in opposition to 
established governmental authority. When such actions are intended 
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to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate 
victims. 
Again in 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
defined terrorism as unlawful use of force or violence against the 
persons or property to intimidate or to coerce a government, the 
civilian population or any segment there of, in furtherance of 
political and social objectives.^^ However, the most accepted 
definition happened to be the one proposed by the U.S. department of 
State in 1984, which spelled out that terrorism is a per-mediated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by substantial groups or clandestine agents, usually to 
influence an audience. But when on October 23, 1983, 241 American 
marines died in their barracks in Bierut, Lebanon, when a suicide 
bomber in a truck crashed through the bases of security parameters, 
the U.S. Department of State revised the word non combatants to 
include, in addition to civilians, military personnel when armed 
confrontation does not take place. 
The terrorists glorify terrorism as means to achieve 
political objectives. It is common knowledge that in the late 19"' 
Century many Russian anarchists did not feel shy in being labelled as 
terrorists or their sympathizers. Apologists for terrorism often 
attempt to counter moral objections by comparing their own acts of 
violence with those of their opponents. By making such a 
comparison, they do not see anything wrong in their actions. For 
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instance, during World War II, the German occupation Forces 
labelled all members of resistance groups as ' terrorists' and thought 
of themselves as patriots and freedom fighters. 
One of the pioneers of modern state terrorism, Maximilan 
Robes Pierre, Justified his brutal actions in his February 1794 
declaration that 'terror is nothing else than immediate justice, 
severe, inflexible, it is therefore an outflow of virtue, it is not so 
much a specific principle of democracy applied to the most pressing 
needs of the motherland'. 
The Russian terrorist organization, "the peoples will" in 1879, 
held that terrorist activity consists of the destruction of the most 
harmful persons in the government, the protection of the people's 
will from spies and the punishment of the officials, lawlessness and 
violence in all the more prominent and important cases where it is 
manifested. The aim of such an activity is to make a dent in the 
prestige of government, to enhance the revolutionary spirit in the 
people, and finally to form a body suited and accustomed to warfare. 
The phenomenon of terrorism, as it is evident, from the above 
discussion, is a strategy whereby violence is used to produce certain 
effects in a group of people so as to attain some political ends. 
Although scholars and diplomats continue to debate over the precise 
meaning of the term, " recent contemporary usage tends to restrict 
its meaning to either random or extortionate violence, aimed 
ultimately at the state." The Encyclopedia of social sciences defines 
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terrorism as a method or the theory behind the method whereby an 
organized group seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the 
systematic use of violence. Terrorist acts are mainly directed against 
persons who are individual agents or representatives of authority. It 
is clear from the above that a militant is one who imposes the 
punishment meted out by his organization upon those who are held to 
interfere with the revolutionary programme, thus he serves notice 
that his organization will be satisfied with nothing short of removal 
of the undesired social or governmental system and of persons 
behind it. Terrorism which is a part of strategy for attaining political 
power has certain other components.^'* Firstly, it is often manifested 
in acts of socially and politically unacceptable violence, secondly, 
there is a consistent pattern of symbolic or representative selection 
of the victim, and thirdly, the revolutionary movement deliberately 
intends these actions to create a psychological affect on specific 
groups and thereby to change their political behaviour and attitude. 
Thus terrorism implies deliberate and systematic murders, 
harassment of the innocent and inspiring fear for political ends. 
Often terrorism and militancy are used interchangeably, which 
is not correct. In militancy there is the need for a sufficiently valid 
cause that can mobilize the core of militants without alienating the 
cause of the public while in terrorism there is no need for a 
sufficiently valid cause.^' The cause of the militants have a sufficient 
degree of legitimacy in the eyes of public which may or may not be 
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the case with terrorism.^^ And lastly, militancy also has some 
legitimacy apparently in the eyes of the opposition and international 
community as well, while these things are totally lacking in 
terrorism." 
If one looks from the point of view of tactics, there seems to 
be no difference between terrorists and freedom fighters. Freedom 
fighters who adhere to the rules of warfare should be treated as 
soldiers and those freedom fighters thai kill civilians on the other 
hand as war criminals. The same categorization applies to soldiers 
acting on behalf of a government. Terrorism in politics, thus, 
represents a radical method or a theory behind this method, whereby 
an organized group of saboteurs seeks to achieve its avowed aims 
through the systematic use of violence. Terrorists primarily aim at 
mobilizing the masses against the government of the day and to shake 
it to such an extent that it succumbs to their demands, for which they 
are prepared for any eventuality. Death and destruction to them are 
not' 'mere threats' but part of programme of action. Seen in this 
perspective , terrorism in politics is a weapon of blackmail and 
coercion, often, they play religious card to gain sympathy and 
confidence of the people , for which a band of dedicated workers is 
recruited and trained ^''. They often resort to such violent methods 
as: Kidnapping and Hostage-taking, hijacking, explosions, political 
murders, suicide attacks etc. 
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1. Kidnapping and Hostage-taking 
Kidnapping and hostage taking is an important weapon of 
terrorism since the dawn of modern international terrorism in the 
late 1960's The worldwide advances in transport and 
communications have made this task easier. Kidnapping and hostage 
taking are inter-complimentary. Both involve siege or detention of 
person or persons such as diplomats, government officials, tourists 
or businessmen. The victims may be kept in a known siege site such 
as an embassy, a private house, or public building, a passenger 
airliner, train or ship or in a concealed place that is known only to the 
terrorists. In a siege situation, the terrorists and their victims are 
besieged in a location that is known to the authorities whereas in 
kidnapping, the perpetrators hold hostage at a location unknown to 
the authorities. Kidnapping and holding of individuals at secret 
locations has often been used by a variety of Middle Eastern and 
Latin American terrorist groups. Latin American terrorists 
particularly have resorted to politically motivated kidnapping of 
foreign businessmen and diplomats. Colombia's kidnapping rates, 
which ran at an annual 600 case in both 1988 and 1989 clearly 
demonstrate the feasibility of this method.^^ 
In most cases of kidnappings, terrorists have a fair chance of 
evading arrest and encounters. First, it is difficult to locate hostages. 
Second, most governments have publicly declared policies of non-
co-operation with the terrorists. However, refusal on the part of the 
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government to accede to the demands of the terrorists often result in 
the killings of hostages. The device of kidnapping has been 
successfully used by the militants to pursue their objectives in the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the inception of militancy in the 
valley, large number of kidnapping cases took place. But only three 
most prominent cases need mention here. The first case of 
kidnapping was reported on Dec. 8, 1989 in which, Rubia Sayeed, the 
daughter of the then Union Home Minister was kidnapped by the 
extremists of Kashmir Liberation Front. She was, however, freed in 
exchange of release of five hardcore militants, namely Hamid Shiekh, 
Noor Mohd. Kalwal, Mohd. Altaf Bhat, Sheer Khan Azad and Javeed 
Ahmad Zargar.'" But in the case of kidnapping of Musheerulhaq, Vice 
Chancellor of Kashmir University, and H.L. Khera Director of H.M.T 
watch factory Srinagar, and Government did not succumb to the 
demands of the militants, for obvious reasons, resulting in the death 
of both the persons. It is this loop sided policy of the Government 
that has sustained and promoted militancy. Prior to the release of 
five militants in exchange of Rubiya Sayeed, the then Chief Minister, 
Farooq Abdullah, had released five militants. 
2. Hijacking 
Hijacking is a term used for the forcible and illegal seizure of 
any vehicle which may be a truck, air-plane or ship' ' . Just like 
kidnapping, hijacking too has been used as an important tactic by the 
militants to achieve their objectives, which often includes release of 
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their comrades drawing attention and publicity to their programme of 
action or for ransom. Hijacking has been common since 1970. A 
number of organizations have been identified for various hijacking 
cases in the world.^^ Between 1971 and 1999 about 13 Indian planes 
were hijacked. " 
3. Explosion or Bombing Operation 
Bombs and explosions have proved to be more convenient, 
handy, economical and effective. Apart from killing people, it can 
create fear psychosis among people and can traumatize the society, 
eventually producing precisely the sort of disruption that the 
terrorists aim at. Often the terrorists are ruthless and indiscriminate 
and do not hesitate to kill innocent citizens. Bomb explosions have 
both long term and short term objectives. For instance the American 
and French Forces left Beirut immediately after the massive 
bombings of October, 1983, otherwise they might not have left so 
soon. Bombings can also be used for successful campaign for 
independence. For instance, Algerian National Liberation Army did 
the same thing against France in the 1950's.^'' The militants have also 
used this technique of bomb explosion in the state of Jammu & 
Kashmir loo. From July 1988 to Dec. 1989, 100 blasts rocked the 
valley in which 55 people including half a dozen police men lost their 
lives.^' 
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4. Assassination 
Assassinations in the context of terrorism implies murder of 
prominent persons for political reasons, which is considered 
rational. The act is usually carefully planned and executed. Terrorists 
often propound theories to give legitimacy and respectability to their 
actions. The basic assumption is that a single murder can change the 
entire course of political events often to their advantage. Such 
incidents have the propensity of enhancing their bargaining power 
also. Terrorists turned to assassination as a tactic to draw public 
attention. The 1981 CIA report on international terrorism confirmed 
the trend: "The number of terrorist incidents apparently aimed at 
causing causalities most notably assassination attempts increased 
dramatically in 1980."^^ For example Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
was assassinated on 31 October, 1984 by her own guards, Sant 
Harchand Singh Longowal, President of the Akali Dal, was 
assassinated by the militant sikhs for entering into an accord between 
his party and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in July, 1985. In the spring 
of 1981, President Reagen was shot as he left Hilton Hotel in 
Washington. Similarly in the Autumn, President Mohammed Ali Rajai 
of Iran and his Prime Minister were killed in a bomb blast in Tehran 
on 30'\ August, 1981. Weeks later a militant in the uniform of 
Egyptian army murdered President Anwar Sadat on 6"' October, 1981 
with bursts of Kalashinkof. 
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5. Suicide attacks 
The sheer terror induced by suicide attackers was first 
experienced in modern times on allied warships in the pacific during 
World War II. It was clear that one aircraft crashing into a ship did 
more damage than a squadron of Bombers. In Oct. 1944, when 
Takijiro Onishi took command of the out dated Japanese Airforce in 
Manila, he made the deliberate crashing of aircraft an official 
tactic." Suicide attacks were also very common among the militant 
groups in the Middle East. Although there were sporadic suicide 
bomb attacks during the 1970's, the technique was developed and 
improvised during Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.'* The militant 
groups operating in Kashmir, Particularly the Lashkar-e-Toiba or the 
Army of Faithful an active militant organization in Jammu and 
Kashmir also did not lag behind. Lashkar's suicide attacks first made 
its appearance in August, 1999 when it stormed the BSF Headquarters 
in Bandipora, killing five BSF personnel including a Deputy Inspector 
General of Police. It was followed by the most daring attacks on the 
Army's 15 corps headquarters at Badami Bagh on November 3, 1999 
resulting in the death of a Major and 9 soldiers. This was followed by 
another attack on the Rashtriya Rifles Headquaters in Khanabal that 
left an officer and four Jawans dead. The Lashker carried out 42 
attacks between August 1999 and December 23, 2000 in which nearly 
150 security personnel died. Ninety-two militants participated in 
these attacks and they lost 28 of its men. •'^  
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RISE OF MILITANCY IN J & K : 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUD AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRENDS 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir is composed of three main 
cultural units and geographical divisions, namely Jammu, Kashmir 
and Ladakh. The Jammu and Kashmir State came into existence as a 
result of the conquest of the Punjab by the British in 1845. The 
territories of Jammu and Kashmir, which formed part of the Sikh, 
state were separated from it. The provinces of Kashmir and Gilgit 
were handed over to Gulab Singh, a feudatory of Sikhs, for a cash 
payment of 75 lakhs of rupees by the British, which marked the 
foundation of the Dogra Rule in the State. The Muslim subjects who 
formed the bulk of the population bore the heaviest brunt of the 
Dogra autocracy, which was highly exploitative. The freedom 
movement was actually a struggle against the oppressive rule of the 
Dogras. The general uprising of the Muslim subjects against the 
Dogras in 1931 was the culmination of a number of early political 
struggles and trends towards social reforms. 
During the period of the Dogras, the people of the State 
suffered miserably. No doubt the British gave the state a semblance 
of peace and to some extent ameliorated the conditions of the 
people but actually the policies at best helped ' the upper classes of 
the Hindus in particular!' There was not much change in the 
economic conditions of the masses. The reasons for the economic 
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backwardness of the masses were due to the very character of the 
state, its institution of the Jagirdan system and the system of 
revenue, taxation and above all a corrupt administration. The feudal 
character of the state was evident in the claim of its ruler that 'all 
lands in Kashmir belonged to him'.^ 
The Maharaja was, thus, the biggest Jagirdar at the apex of a 
chain of Jagirdars subordinate to him. Most of the state was 
divided into a number of Jagirs ( estates ) and these estates were 
granted by the Maharaja to the members of the royal family, to their 
relatives, to the persons who belonged to the same caste and 
religion and to those persons who had proved by service or 
otherwise, their loyalty to the person of the ruler as well as his 
throne. The Maharaja also enjoyed unquestioned authority to deprive 
any person of the estate granted to him. 
The population of Kashmir suffered a lot at the hands of 
these Jagirdars. Jammu and Kashmir being an agricultural state, 
about 85 percent of the people lived in villages. Farming was the 
backbone of the economy. Defective revenue system accompanied 
by corrupt officialdom, exploitation of the cultivators by the 
Jagirdars crippled the peasants economically. The Jagirdar was 
practically the master of his estate. The peasant was nothing more 
than a slave. The Jagirdar was ' the judge, the administrator and the 
police.' ^ Within his estate, he had unlimited power of collecting 
revenue in his /a;^ /A- through men or servants employed by him for 
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the purpose. Below, the Jagirdars were Chakdars who used to be 
temporary landholders. The Chakdar like the Jagirdar was equally 
harsh with the cultivator. ' He was entitled to one half of the 
produce of his chak^'. '* Apart from cultivation, they also rendered 
other services to the Jagirdars, for which they were never paid. 
Under the system of Jagirdari, the peasants were virtually redueed 
to the state of serfs, which is the sine quanon of a feudal state. 
The most abominable feature of this agrarian state was the 
unsound system of land revenue. This system was run by a host of 
officials whose corrupt practices had not only brought down upon 
the peasants a moral degeneration but it also had a ' more 
momentous effect on the character and development of people than 
it had in any other native state' ' of the Indian subcontinent. Almost 
the entire land revenue establishment in the province consisted of 
the pandits to the general detriment of the masses in general and to 
the Musalmans of Kashmir' in particular.*^ The first fifty years of 
the Dogra Rule was responsible for disseminating in the minds of 
its subjects the seeds of resentment against its very existence .^ 
In 1880, the state resolved to realize the land revenue in full 
through the revenue officials. But the worst part of it was that the 
officials exploited the system more in their own interests than in 
the interests of the state. The revenue was collected with such 
severity and harshness that the cultivators had to sell off even their 
cattle and household articles. Most of the cultivators were not in a 
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position to pay the revenue in full and they were forced, under fear 
of severe penalty, to leave their homes. They migrated to other 
villages where they worked as farm labourers with some privileged 
landholders." This system was soon found unsuccessful and it was 
replaced by a new device known as 'Izad Boli'. Under this, village 
began to be auctioned to the highest bidder. The contractors at the 
convenience of the revenue officials exploited the cultivator in the 
name of collection of revenue, adding to their miseries. Apart from 
the revenue on the produce, the peasants were also subjected to the 
payment of various other kinds of taxes ". 
The low salaries of the revenue officials often compelled 
them to join hands with the contractors. The Tehsildar (a revenue 
officer) for instance, was paid a salary of thirty rupees a month 
which was hardly sufficient to meet his ends . He also used to keep 
his relatives and friends with him known as mudahir (men of trust 
and confidence) and to whom he delegated the duties of his office. 
Even the tehsil police, lived on the forced hospitability of the 
villagers as these people were exempted from the state tax The 
villagers were also subjected to physical torture. The Muslim 
cultivators who formed the majority were the worst sufferers. The 
deteriorating economic conditions had virtually reduced the 
villagers to pauperism. More than 80% of the people living in 
villages were under debt. 
The most pernicious method of oppression was the system of 
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beggary or forced labour. The main cause of beggary was the lack 
of avenues of employment for the poor, oppressed and the labour 
class.'" The system of the beggary was an insult to humanity and 
degrading to society. Economically, the absence of the peasants 
from their fields brought agricultural activity to a standstill, which 
resulted in heavy losses to the state. The villagers were also 
required to render to the officials their services in building their 
houses in the city or in cultivating their waste lands without wages. 
The industrial labour such as shawl bafs (shawl weavers) men 
working as labourers and artisans in the silk factory, carpet weavers, 
papier-mache workers, wood carvers, gabba makers were also 
affected badly during the Dogra regime." The monthly income of a 
shawl baf for example, did not exceed seven or eight rupees and 
out of these, they had to pay five rupees as tax, which usually left 
him with three rupees, or so to live on. '^  The worst part of it is that 
they could not change their profession lor bettering their economic 
conditions because shawl baf was not permitted to change his 
profession because of the fear on part of the government that ' it 
would reduce the Maharaja's revenue.''^ The shawl weaver 
therefore, forced to remain economically backward and subservient. 
Same was the case with people involved in silk industry. By 1921, 
the factory had ' over fifty thousand rearers of silk worms in the 
villages and five thousand labourers were engaged in the factories 
in Srinagar..."'* Their plight was equally pitiable. 
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Politically suppressed and economically exploited, the 
Muslims of the J & K State also suffered from educational 
backwardness. Their own ignorance, the conservative outlook of 
their religious leaders, the unsympathetic attitude of non-Muslims 
towards the Muslim students in the schools and the discriminatory 
policies of the Dogra government'^ have contributed to the plight 
of Muslims. The rot lies at the root, poverty which was 'not an 
excuse but a real impediment.'^ 
The anti-Muslim attitude of the Dogra Raj further 
added to their miseries. In 1909, Maharaja Pratap Singh had directed 
his Education Minister to draw up a scheme for making primary 
education free and compulsory throughout the state,'"' but the 
minister was reluctant to do so on the plea that it would be looked 
upon as an act of tyranny. He also pleaded that if the wage earning 
children of Muslim parents were interfered with, the parents would 
not take it kindly, that in the absence of public spirited men, the 
benefits of the measure would not be understood by the people, etc. 
etc.,'^ hence, the programme was dropped . The Muslim subjects 
thus came to realise that nothing could save them but their own 
efforts. They started their efforts in this regard but their pleas and 
petitions went unheeded, they thus began to contact the influential 
Muslims outside the state to brief them about their despicable 
conditions. As a result, the All India Mohammedan Conference sent 
in 1913, a deputation headed by Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan. The 
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deputation presented a memorandum to the Maharaja ' requesting 
him to provide his Muslim subjects facilities for education'.'^ Two 
years later, the Government sent their own Education 
Commissioner, Sharp, ' to investigate and advise the Durbar on 
educational arrangements in the state', °^ who on the basis of his 
survey admitted that the Muslims of Kashmir had been suffering 
from educational disabilities and that the need of the hour was to 
improve their conditions. He recommended an increase in the 
number of primary schools so that each village with a population of 
500 or more should have at least one school, provide training to the 
students in Government schools, in such arts as calligraphy, 
accountancy etc, increase in the number of Arabic teachers by at 
least one hundred. Provide staff to the village schools, as far as 
possible with teachers from the majority population, provide 
training to the sons of artisans in works of their respective 
professions and in case they are uneducated, should be given 
instruction in three R's. He also recommended a special scholarship 
for Muslim students as well as Muslim teachers to further pursue 
their studies. 
Most of these recommendations were accepted by His 
Highness but were lightly treated by his Ministers and instructions 
issued by him were seldom followed by those in charge of education 
department who were invariably (non Muslims ) non- Kashmiris',^' 
The question of representation of Kashmiris in government 
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services was also raised, time and again. There were many Muslims 
who had passed the first arts as early as 1909 and the B.A. as early 
as 1915. By 1925 there was sizeable number of Muslim graduates, 
F.As and matriculates in Kashmir. About 100 young Muslims were 
educated in Urdu and Persian.^^ Yet between 1910 and 1930 the 
Muslim representation in the state service did not exceed 15 % both 
in the gazetted and non-gazetted ranks.^^ An appalling discrimination 
against Muslims was evident in the Medical Department too. The 
posts of meniab, such as Khidmatgars and the like did not require 
any qualification except an elementary knowledge of three R's. In 
fact non-Muslims predominated as cooks, compounders and 
khidmatgars. The relative strength of Hindus and Muslims in the 
posts is clear from the following table.^^ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Khidmatgnr 
Cooks 
Compounders 
Total 
Musi 
12 
9 
4 
25 
inis Non-M 
38 
29 
55 
122 
us lims Total 
50 
58 
59 
147 
Similar was the case with other departments such as Forest, 
Agriculture etc. So for as the military services were concerned , 
they were exclusively reserved for the Dogras particularly Rajputs, 
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"with, more than sixty percent of gazetted appointments going to 
them".^^ The Kashmiris, Muslims and non Muslims , were seldom 
recruited . It was an avowed policy of the Dogras to exclude 
Kashmiris from the army ranks inspite of the fact they pay for its 
maintenance in lakhs of rupees. Kashmiri held many distinguished 
positions in the British Indian army but in their own state, they were 
not recruited.^* 
The political freedoms, press, platform and forming of 
associations, was totally banned in the state during the first eight 
decades of the Dogra Rule. In the absence of freedom of press and 
platform, there was hardly any public option. As for the press, "it is 
practically non- existent with the result that the government is not 
benefited to the extent that it should be by the impact of healthy 
criticism."^'' There hardly existed any rapport between the ruler and 
his subjects, who lived in object poverty, squalor and ignorance. No 
meeting could be held in a public place " without the permission of 
the District Magistrate."^^ And, "no new sabha or society or 
association shall be formed within the state without the permission 
of His Highness"." 
Disputes over religious places were frequently reported in 
the Dogra regime. Apparently the relations between the Hindus and 
Muslims were very cordial and peaceful. But in fact, there was a 
deep wave of suspicion, hostility and bitterness running at the 
bottom of their social relations. These disputes dates back to 1893, 
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when a dispute between the two communities arose over a bathing 
place and claims and counter claims of each community over certain 
religious places. There was also a dispute between the two 
communities over a piece of land known as Hara Masjid . It so 
happened that on 10"" of May 1916, a foundation stone was laid for 
the construction of Jamia Masjid in Srinagar. While the 
construction was in progress, the Kashmir pandits claimed that the 
land of Hara Masjid belonged to them and that they wanted to 
construct a temple. A similar dispute over a piece of land between 
the two communities was reported in 1924, some twenty-four 
kilometers away from Srinagar at Nagabal in Islamabad (Anantang). 
The Pandits wanted to construct a temple on a piece of land just 
opposite a mosque at Nagbal. The Muslims raised an objection on 
the ground that the land belonged to the mosque There was a similar 
dispute over the Khanqah shrine, Srinagar on August 24, 1924: 
Thus, there was unrest on almost all fronts. The Dogra rule 
was marked by injustice, exploitation and oppression. The Muslims 
were its worst victims. In 1924, Earl Reading visited Kashmir on 
the invitation of Maharaja Pratap Singh. The Muslim delegation had 
a secret meeting with the Viceroy and presented to him a 
Memorandum of their grievances and demands.^" The Viceroy 
instead of looking into the problems sent the Memorandum to 
Maharaja, who got furious and, " confiscated the pensions and grants 
which most of the signatories to the Memorandum received from 
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the State and they were banished from Kashmir".^' Pratap Singh 
died in 1925, and was succeeded by his nephew Maharaja Hari Singh. 
Hari Singh on the assumption of the thron-e, announced a number of 
concessions which infact benifited the landowners among them".^ ^ 
The prevailing discontent among the bulk of the Muslim population 
remained unchanged. 
In 1930, while Maharaja Hari Singh had gone to Europe the 
educated Muslim young men presented a Memorandum to the state 
government demanding reservations in state services for the 
Muslims in proportion to their numerical strength, relaxation of 
qualification in favour of Muslim aspirants for state services in 
view of their general educational and economic backwardness, grant 
of scholarship to Muslim students, appointment of a separate 
Muslim Directorate in the State to supervise the education of 
Muslim students and the appointment of Muslim teachers in the 
Government schools to protect the educational interests of the 
Muslim children." The state did not want to annoy the Hindus and 
the Memorandum was turned down. '^' Adding fuel to the fire, in 
March 1931 a number of incidents like the desecration of certain 
Muslim scriptures, further alienated the Muslims from the state.^ ^ 
The incidents evoked widespread responses from a number of 
Muslim Organizations in the Punjab. A number of Kashmir 
committees sprang up all over India to help the Muslims resist 
oppression in the state and Central Kashmir Committee was 
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constituted at Lahore to co-ordinate the work of different Kashmir 
committees and Muslim Organizations. Realizing the gravity of the 
problem, the Government appointed a commission to enquire into 
the causes of the incidents and invited a delegation of Muslims to 
wait upon the Prime Minister of the State and present their 
grievances to him. A Muslim delegation of seven members including 
Sheikh Abdullah, a teacher in a government school, was constituted 
in Srinagar to present the Muslims grievances to the Government. 
In June 1931, a resident of the Frontier Province, Abdul 
Qadeer, who had come to Srinagar in the service of an English man 
was arrested and put on trial on charges of having delivered 
seditious speeches in Srinagar town. On 13"" July, mobs of Muslims 
clashed with the Dogra troops in the premises of Srinagar Central 
Jail, while trial proceedings against Abadul Qadeer were being 
conducted. The troops opened fire as a result of which twenty-one 
demonstrators were killed. As the news of the firing in Jail spread, 
communal riots broke out in Srinagar and other parts of the 
province and the Government imposed Martial Law in the riot 
affected areas to bring the situation under control.'* The Muslim 
agitation was suppressed with a heavy hand and peace was restored 
in the province. However the imposed calm was short-lived and the 
Muslim agitation flared up once again in September, and engulfed 
the province of Jammu also." Troops were once again called to 
quell the disturbances.'* Maharaja Hari Singh commissioned Sir 
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Barjir Dalai, the Chief Justice of the State High Court, to conduct 
an enquiry into the causes which led to the firing in the Srinagar 
jail. The Muslims boycotted the Commission of Enquiry and 
demanded the appointment of an Englishman or a Muslim to conduct 
the said enquiry . The Government of India lost no time to instruct 
the British President in the State to convey to the ruler that the 
Government viewed with concern the developments in the state. The 
Government of India asked the Resident to advise the ruler to seek 
the assistance of the Government of India in the appointment of a 
Commission of Enquiry or at best make a request for the services 
of a Muslim High Court judge from India, to join the committee of 
Enquiry already appointed by him. The Resident conveyed to Hari 
Singh the instructions of the Government of India. 
Hari Singh sent a long dispatch to the viceroy in which he 
explained the genesis of the entire crisis and assured him that the 
situation in the state was well under control. Hari Singh politely 
refused to accept the suggestions of the Government of India. 
Meanwhile Maharaja Hari Singh dismissed his Chief Minister, G.EC 
Wakefiled and Raja Hari Krishan Koul, a Kashmiri Brahmin, 
domiciled outside the state was appointed as the Chief Minister of 
the State. Shortly after assuming office, the new Chief Minister 
opened negotiations with the Muslim leaders. An agreement was 
reached which stipulated the suspension of the agitation and release 
of political detenues and prisoners. The agreement also stipulated 
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that the Muslim grievances would be considered after the enquiry 
into the disturbances. 
A section of the Muslim leadership disapproved of the 
agreement and termed it as a betrayal of the Muslim cause. On 
September 21, disturbances broke out once again in the Kashmir 
Province. Troops were once again called out to put down the 
disturbances. In Sopore, Baramullah, Shopian and Islamabad 
(Anantnag) townships of the Kashmir Province, the troops opened 
fire on the Muslim demonstrators and a number of them were 
killed.^' On 28"" September, a week after the Muslim agitation had 
restarted, the Government of India issued a peremptory warning to 
the ruler asking him to take immediate steps to redress the 
grievances of the Muslims in the state and institute an enquiry 
headed by a British Officer into the causes of the disturbances in 
the state. The Government of India also asked the ruler of the State 
to appoint a British Officer, nominated by the Government of India, 
as his Prime Minister.''" 
Two more instances of interference with the religious affairs 
of the Muslims took place in Jammu in Aprl 1931. On April 29, 
1931, when the Muslims were busy in a prayer meeting on the Id-
day, a sub-inspector, Babu Khem Chand tried to stop the Imam, 
Moulvi Atta ullah Shah Bukhari, from reading out the khutba in 
which the Imam ' spoke of pharoah as a cruel and tyrant king'. The 
sub-inspector warned the Imam that he should stop delivering a 
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political speech. He told the Imam that only the Namaz was 
permitted. He forgot that the khutba is also as important as the 
Namaz. The sub-inspector's behaviour was taken as an affront. A 
protest meeting was arranged by the Young Muslim Association, 
presided over by Mistry Hussain Baksh, Choudry Gouhar Rehman, 
the secretary of the association, observed '^ that "... the conditions 
under which the Muslims of Kashmir live are known to the entire 
world. Our political suppression and educational backwardness were 
sufficient to ruin our lives. Our little left religious freedom is now 
being crushed. We remained silent when we saw the state ignoring 
our economic backwardness and poverty. We did not utter a single 
word when things lawful for us were made unlawful... for God's 
sake, tell us, how long shall we be forced to remain mum. Muslims 
should now make every effort to live a life of peace and honour..." 
Several resolutions were passed at the meeting. The Government 
was requested to punish the police officer for his gross 
misbehaviour. The copies of the Resolution were sent to the 
Maharaja and other authorities of the state. 
Another incident occurred the same day at Dgore in Samba 
Tehsil about 15 miles from Jammu over a water tank used by the 
Hindu Brahmins and the Muslim Weavers. In order to offer their 
Eid prayer, the Muslims began to draw water from the tank for 
performing the ablutions. The Brahmins tried to prevent the 
Muslims from using water. Soon, communal riots broke out in 
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Mirpur and poonch districts of the Jammu province/^ This and 
similar other incidents prompted the young men of the Reading 
Party to prepare a draft of demands to be presented to the Maharaja. 
On June 18, 1931, Moulvi Mohd. Yousf Shah sent a circular letter 
to the Presidents and Secretaries of different anjumans, inviting 
them to attend a meeting to consider the draft of demands, which 
was prepared by the youngmen. On June 20, 1930, the meeting took 
place at the office of the Anjuman -1 - Nusratul-ul-Islam and a draft 
of demands was unanimously approved."^ Five persons namely 
Ghulam Ahmad Ashai, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Moulvi 
Mohammad Yousf Shah, Mirwaiz Hamdani and Syed Ghulam Hasan 
Shah were selected as the representatives of the Muslims of 
Kashmir in all public and political matters. To introduce the leaders 
to the public, the young men of the Reading Room party organized a 
public meeting at Khanqah-I-Mualla on June 21, 1931. Thirty 
thousand people attended the meeting. Oh. Ahmad Ashai announced 
the names of the representatives to the people. The names of Saad-
ud-Din Shawl and Munshi Shihab-ud-Din were added to the list of 
the five already approved. The group reflected a blend of divergent 
views. On the same day and at the same place, the Governor of the 
state had to address the public. When he rose to deliver his speech, 
the people refused to listen to him. Instead they proceeded towards 
the Jamia Masjid where a public meeting was instantly organised. At 
this meeting Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah announced that in case he 
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was arrested, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar would succeed him to lead the 
movement. An important feature of the this formative period of 
freedom struggle in Kashmir was the task of the leaders to prepare 
the people for any kind of eventuality they might have to face in the 
future. To forge unity among the people was the main object of the 
leaders at that time. 
The scenario, thus, in the state led to hostility between 
Hindus and Muslims. The open appeasement of Hindus by the state 
and the harassment of Muslims created a gulf between Hindus and 
Muslims on one hand and Muslims and the State on the other. It was 
against this backdrop that the Kashmir committee was formed on 
July 13, 1931 with a view to bring pressure upon Government of 
India to bestow basic human rights on the Kashmiris, to acquaint the 
ruler with the sordid affairs of his State, to impress upon the 
Viceroy and the Foreign Department of the Government of India the 
need for an independent Commission of Inquiry in Kashmir affairs, 
to seek a new interpretation to the Treaty of Amritsar which had 
deprived the Kashmiris of their property rights in the state and to 
make the Kashmir affairs known to entire world through books, 
pamphlets, press etc. 
The Kashmir Committee despite its best efforts failed to 
make a dent in the state politics. The Maharaja was as adamant as 
before to negotiate with the newly formed committee."'' The 
Kashmir Committee out of the frustration, celebrated the Kashmir 
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Day on August 14, 1931 both within and outside the state, in Delhi 
and other places. The state responded by arresting Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah in September, which witnessed agitations all 
over the State. The police resorted to firing at a number of places, 
the worst being at the Jamia Masjid on Sep. 22, where about twenty 
two thousand people assembled for a meeting. It resulted in many 
casualties.'*^ There were also reports of violence from other parts 
of the state, which only augmented the revolutionary fervor of the 
people. 
At last better sense was dawn on the Maharaja, who on Oct. 5, 
1931 granted general amnesty to all political prisoners and they 
were unconditionally released. This was the first victory of the 
masses."^ On October 6, 1931, the Muslim leaders organized a 
public meeting at the Jamia Masjid, Srinagar where a Resolution 
was passed to felicitate the Maharaja at his birthday. The Resolution 
also expressed the hope that the demands of Muslim subjects which 
will soon be presented to His Highness, may receive the honour of 
acceptance so that the Muslim subjects also may come out of their 
degraded position and attain a place of honour in their own 
country."*^  A charter of demands was presented to the Maharaja on 
in 
Oct. 19, 1931."* These demands marked a new approach^the politics 
of the State. Huge public meeting was held on Oct. 20, 1931 at 
Khanqua-I- Manila and on October 26 , 1931 the Central standing 
committee of the All India Kashmir Muslim Conference passed a 
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resolution at its meetings held at the Barkat Ali Mohammadan Hall, 
Lahore, urging upon the Maharaja to accede to these demands 
without any delay as these demands reflect the feelings and 
aspirations of the majority of subjects . The Resolution emphasized 
that non-acceptance of the demands ' will be a source of constant 
disharmony, unrest and discontent'."' Just after the presentation of 
demands, the political disturbances were reviewed and the leader 
arrested in January 1932. The Kashmir agitation started by the 
Majlis Ahrar of the Punjab towards the end of 1931 had assumed 
great dimensions in the beginning of 1932. With a view to bring 
pressure on ' the state government to remove the disabilities of the 
Muslims and accept their demands \ the Ahrars dispatched groups 
of volunteers to Kashmir to launch satyagrah there. The arrest of 
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah on January 25, 1932 worsened the 
situation, which resulted in the replacement of Raja Hari Krishan 
Koul by Lt.Col. Elliot James as Prime Minister in February 1932. A 
series of steps like the grant of freedom of press and platform, 
release of the Sheikh , were taken to restore normalcy in the state. 
These new concessions prompted the Muslim leaders to establish 
the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. Agitated over these 
developments, the Hindus launched protests and agitation all over 
the State. The Government instead of succumbing to these pressures 
dealt with the situation firmly and many Pandit leaders were 
arrested.^" The Muslims, despite the prima facie unity, failed to 
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consolidate themselves into an organized and well-knit group . The 
mutual rivalries among them resulted in the break up of the All 
Jammu and Kashmir Muslims conference with Mirwaize Moulvi 
Yousf Shah parting ways from the Sheikh as setting up of the "The 
Azad Muslim Conference" '^ The Muslim conference to make it 
more broad based, made an appeal to the Hindus and Sikhs to join it 
in its struggle against the oppressive policies of the State. It 
succeeded, to a large extent in projecting the image of a secular 
organization. Encouraged by the response, the working committee 
of the Muslim Conference met in Srinagar in Feb. 1936 and adopted 
resolutions demanding establishment of responsible Government, 
legislative assembly and abolishing of separate electorates and 
introduction of universal adult franchise." The Muslim Conference 
leaders appealed to the ruler that the constitutional reforms' 
introduced in 1934 had done considerable harm to the evolution of 
representative and responsible political institutions in the state and 
urged upon him to widen the scope of constitutional provisions 
envisaged by the Constitution Act of 1934 and introduce a 
substantial measure of responsibility in the state government. The 
working committee also took a decision to organize a demonstration 
on 8"" May 1936 in support of establishment of responsible 
political institutions in the state." It was however made clear that 
the protest would not be against the Dogra rule as such but for 
piecemeal establishment of responsible Government. With this, the 
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freedom movement in Kashmir got momentum. ^^  Soon, some 
members of the Legislative Assembly also joined the movement in 
favour of responsible Government.^^ The Government, however, did 
not respond and consequently on May 8, 1936, the Responsible 
Government Day was observed all over the State, at the call of the 
Muslim Conference. 
The second anniversary of the responsible Government 
Day was equally observed with the same enthusiasm on August 5, 
1938 by organising demonstrations and protests and the 
Government reacted by placing Srinagar under Section - 144 on 
August 26, 1938 and by serving notices on Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, 
Sardar Budh Singh, Maulana Syed Massodi and Khwaja Ghulam 
Mohd. Sadique requiring them to present themselves before the 
Additional District Magistrate on 29 August and to furnish 
securities of 1000 rupees each for keeping good behaviour. The 
leaders did not take cognisance of the notices and openly defied 
Section - 144 by organizing public meetings at Hazratbal and Azad 
Park on 28 and 29 August respectively. This resulted in the state 
vandalism in the form of indiscriminate arrests, raids and worst of 
all children's books, the ornaments of women and even cooking 
utensils were sold to realize fines.^* The agitation lasted for about 
one and a half month. During this period 975 persons were arrested 
out of whom 500 were arrested under 19-L, in which the cause of 
arrest need not be disclosed." The imprisonment of top political 
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leaders caused slackness in the movement. The police atrocities and 
extortion of heavy fines from poor compelled the Secretary of War 
Council to suspend the movement in mid-November, 1938. The 
movement however continued, in some form or the other, 
expressing resentment against the Government. 
With the transfer of power and partition of the sub-continent, 
new problems cropped up. The state of Jammu and Kashmir (like 
Hyderabad and Junagadh) neither joined the Indian Union nor the 
State of Pakistan, which induced both the countries to trouble in the 
fish waters. Geographically, it could be a part of India or Pakistan 
but since the majority of the population constituted Muslims, the 
case of Pakistan apparently seemed strong. Besides, its best 
communication with the outside world lay through Pakistan, and this 
was the route taken by the bulk of its exports. Moreover, the waters 
of the Indus, Jhelum and Chinab which flow through Jammu and 
Kashmir were essential for the prosperity of agricultural life of 
Pakistan. Realising the strategic importance of Kashmir instead of 
solving the problem through dialogue and negotiations with the 
Maharaja resorted to clandestine activities by sending armed 
tribesmen. The Maharaja got panicky and made frantic requests to 
India to send its army to crush the rebellion. India taking advantage 
of the situation briefed the Maharaja that he should sign the 
instrument of accession first, which he promptly accepted on 26 
October and India flew its troops into the state the next day. 
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When Maharaja signed the instrument of accession, 
Mountbatten introduced a provision that he will only countersign 
the instrument on the condition that Nehru would hold a plebiscite 
to ascertain the views of the Kashmiri citizens.^^ Simultaneously 
India also lodged a complaint with the UN to call upon Pakistan to 
withdraw its forces. The emphasis shifted in the Security Council, 
to the dismay of India, from aggression to plebiscite and 
accordingly, the Council passed its first resolution on 17 January 
1948 calling on both sides to help ease tension. ^•^ Three days later, 
the Council passed another Resolution to create a United Nation's 
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to exercise a 
mediatory role to investigate facts including the charges made by 
Pakistan.*" By the time UNCIP reached the subcontinent in July 
1948, the council through its Resolution on 20"" January, 1948 had 
raised the commission's strength to five and had instructed it to use 
its mediatory role to restore order and to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir in co-operation with both the Governments *'. Initially 
India also agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, which is evident 
from the joint communique of the Prime Ministers o f India and 
Pakistan in November 1953. It provided, " the Kashmir issue was 
read threadbare, it was opined that this should be settled in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The most feasible methods of ascertaining the wishes of the people 
was by fair and impartial plebiscite." Such a plebiscite has been 
49 
Chapter 2 
agreed to some years back but progress, however could not be made 
because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary 
issues. The Prime Ministers now decided to settle down these 
preliminary issues in order to arrive at agreement " The Security 
Council's President McNaughton, proposed that India and Pakistan 
should withdraw their forces immediately from Kashmir. New Delhi 
rejected the proposal. Since then nothing concrete emerged and the 
tension between the two countries got further escalated. The two 
wars created further bitterness and Kashmir became an irritant for 
all times to come between India and Pakistan. In fact, neither of the 
two countries are serious about resolving the issue as it became 
politically significant to both the countries to parade it as and when 
it becomes necessary. The first serious effort to sort out the 
Kashmir tangle was made in December 1962, two months after 
India's defeat at the hands of China. Both the USA and UK which 
stood by New Delhi during the war, influenced Nehru to initiate 
talks with Ayoub Khan. The two countries held six rounds of talks 
spread over six weeks but could not reach an agreement. The 
specific points which the two sides covered were: 
a) A proposal to hand-over Poonch Town and a few other 
places ( about 3000sq. miles) to Pakistan. 
b) Pakistan's suggestion of a boundary which would give 
India Jammu plus a small tract of land in Kashmir. Pakistan renewed 
its demand for a plebiscite under the aegis of the UN. 
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After the war of 1965 between India and Pakistan, Soviet 
Union took the initiative and brought the Indian Prime Minister, Lai 
Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan's president Ayuob Khan to Tashkent, 
where a declaration was signed. This was first time that Pakistan 
affirmed in writing ' not to resort to force' and to settle the 
Kashmir dispute through peaceful negotiations." The same peaceful 
approach was underlined in the Shimla Agreement, in 1972 between 
Indira Ghandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Under the Shimla Agreement 
the two countries resolved to settle down their differences by 
peaceful means and promised not to unilaterally alter the situation. 
The two also under took not to provide assistance or encouragement 
to any act detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and 
harmonious relation between the two. ^'^ 
However, Islamabad was in no position to bargain at that time 
because in the 1971 war it had lost its Eastern Wing and a large 
tract of land in West Pakistan. New Delhi also had with it 9()P00 
Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war. There was no conflict 
between India and Pakistan since the Shimla Agreement but there 
has been no settlement either. Shiekh Abdullah had signed a Six 
Point Agreement with Mrs. Gandhi on 24 February, 1975, as known 
"The Kashmir Accord". It essentially reaffirmed Kashmir's status in 
continuation of Article-370, as a part of India and on 25'^ February, 
Shiekh Abdullah was once again enthusiastically sworn in as the 
Chief Minister of Kashmir after nearly twenty years. But his 
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popularity had suffered due to local criticism of his 'deal' with Mrs. 
Gandhi and he was to soon regret his association with the Congress 
Paity. " 
An important element in the Kashmiri psyche has always been 
a sense of discrimination by New Delhi towards Srinagar. The 
accession was followed by the 1952, Delhi Agreement between 
Shiekh Abdullah and Jawahar Lai Nehru, whereby autonomy was 
guaranteed by providing that' the Indian Parliament could not frame 
laws without the consent of State Assembly except in the areas of 
defence, external affairs and communication'.^^ The Agreement also 
recognized the State flag, common citizenship and spelt out the 
mode of appointment of the head of state. It also formalised the 
Union State financial arrangements. Ironically between 1953 and 
1975, both the instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement 
were fragrantly violated and laws were passed by the Union 
infringing the autonomy of the State.*^ It is clear from the Accord 
between Sheikh Abdullah and Indra Ghandhi which admitted that 
'many of the laws passed after the 1953 had eroded the state's 
autonomy'.** The Accord was severely criticized and the Shiekh 
who reposed faith in the Accord and had given up the demand of 
plebiscite soon realized his folly. Disenchanted supporters of the 
plebiscite broke away and the seeds of discontent were sown in the 
Valley, which in the years to come assumed dangerous proportions. 
The present crisis and turmoil is the product of lop-sided politics 
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and politics of convinience and manipulation on the part of New 
Delhi towards Kashmir. Repeated rigging of elections coupled with 
unprincipled compromises created a dismal mosaic of national and 
secular life in the State. The Nehru-Abdullah Accord of 1952, the 
Indra-Abdullah Accord of 1975 and The Raju-Farooq Alliance of 
1986 provided more cosmetic touches rather than healing the 
wounds. The Congress, inspite of its rule for about twenty years 
between 1953 and 1973 failed to create a secular atmosphere. Its 
rule only alienated people and gave a new impetus to the communal 
problem. 
Meera Sharma, rightly observes that forty years of misrule 
and manipulation by Delhi, erosion of the powers enshrined in 
Article-370 of the Constitution which gives Jammu and Kashmir a 
special status, putting into cold storage of the promise of plebiscite 
have consolidated the people's desire for a separate state. The 
political leadership in the state failed miserably on all fronts, 
political, economic, educational, secular, to give proper directions. 
As a result, lack of economic development, illiteracy, 
unemployment and sense of alienation and discontent reigned 
supreme in the state. The political leadership definitely lacked 
consistency and a sense of vision. Of Sheikh Abdullah for instance 
it is said that he is 'a Communalist in Kashmir, a Communist in 
Jammu and a Nationalist in New Delhi'r^ It is this scenario, which 
was exploited by the Plebiscite Front set up in August, 1955 by 
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Mirza Afzal Beig and other organizations, which gradually drifted 
towards militancy. 
After the 1964 Holy Relic movement, there was a 
phenomenal rise in the secessionist youth politics in the State. Two 
prominent youth organizations Students And Youth League and 
Young Men's League emerged on the political canvass at the 
connivance of the Front,'*^ creating further unrest in the state. Apart 
from these, other organizations such as Youth Action Committee 
and Youth Plebiscite Front also dominated the political scene, 
although for a brief period. It is alleged that some of these 
organizations had established rapport with the Pakistani infiltrators 
who made their presence felt on August 5, that year. At the 
beginning, these organizations confined themselves to the right of 
self determination as its main plank and their movement was by and 
large peaceful, with no trace of militancy in it. The fragmentation 
of youth organizations and multiplicity of their number, however, 
infused, an element of militancy in some of them. It was in 1968, 
that a group of students from Ghandhi Memorial College resolved 
to initiate an armed struggle in the state, by forcibly entering the 
Islamia College premises in the dead of night with the intention of 
stealing rifles from the N.C.C. room of the college. However, the 
Chowkidar of the college grappled with the intruders and nabbed one 
of them. The incident made headlines and about eight students were 
arrested in this connection by the police. They were also tried in 
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camera in what is properly known as the Islamia College Conspiracy 
Case. After two years, the students involved in this case were 
released on bail, and the case was withdrawn with the Sheikh's 
return to power in 1975^'. Since 1967, small groups were nabbed 
for either having planned subversive activities or having indulged in 
militancy related incidents. It was in January 1971, that authorities 
claimed to have unearthed a gang of subversives who planned large-
scale disturbances in the State. Some persons were arrested in 
connection with an attempt of looting Hazratbal Branch of Jammu 
and Kashmir Bank. The organization responsible for these activities 
was identified, namely the Alfateh, which soon emerged as a well 
organized and closely knit militant organization, with an objective 
to liberate Kashmir by resorting to armed struggle. Its genesis, 
however, is not known. It is commonly believed that it is the brain 
child of Plebiscite Front as several prominent leaders of Alfateh 
were known close confidants of Mirza Beig. In the wake of the bank 
decoity, large scale raids were conducted and about 250 persons 
mostly students were arrested. But only sixteen were tried on 
charges of sedition. Persons were identified as having close links 
with the outfit, prominent among them were Ghulam Rasool 
Zahgeer, Nazir Ahmad Wani, then a district Agriculture Officer in 
the State Government, Mohd Fazul Haq, Farooq Batt,Abdul Alia, 
Mohd. Altaf Khan alias Azam Inquilabi and others. Most of these 
leaders were arrested. In the jail, the central leadership of Alfateh 
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got divided into two groups, one led by Ghulam Rasool Zahgeer 
which was pro-plebiscite while the other headed by Nazir Ahmad 
Wani which was deadly against the Plebiscite Front leaders 
including late Sheikh Abdullah, who was the chief patron of the 
Front. Towards the end of 1973, when Beig-Partasarthy dialogue 
commenced, all the arrested activists of Alfateh were released on 
bail. The two factions inside emerged as two political parties , the 
Awami Inquilabi Mahaz (People's Revolutionary Front) led by 
Zahgeer and the Peoples League headed by Nazir Ahmad Wani of 
Inquilabi Mahaz which raised the bogey of separation of Jammu and 
Kashmir from the Indian Union. It is commonly believed that Mirza 
Beig wanted to use it as a pressure group to further his own political 
image . After the 1975 Kashmir Accord, this organisation was 
wound up and its members were either inducted into government 
service or given other favours . 
On the other hand Peoples League emerged as a main anti-
Accord youth organization. It held a number of demonstrations 
against the Accord and its members played an active role in making 
the bandh call given by former Pakistan Prime Minister Z.A. Bhatto, 
against the Accord a great success. The League's think-tank included 
Nazir Wani, Hamidullah Batt and Azam Inquilabi. The most wanted 
Kashmiri Shabir Shah was then junior leader of the League and 
happened to be its d^trict presi<lent. Later, the League also got 
divided into twoi^ .9h the issue, whether it should strive for an Islamic 
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State or Islamic socialist State, the later coinage then being popular 
among the pro Bhutto Youth. Azam Inquillabi left the League in 
1974 to form the Islamic Students And Youth Organisation, which 
was later named Islamic-Jamit-ul-Tulba and Tajamul Islam, presently 
living in some Muslim country, became its first president. From 
1977 to 1982, the separatist youth movement virtually died down. 
The Peoples League got confined to few youth like its president, 
Farooq Rehmani, and then general secretary,ShabirShah. Nazir 
Ahmad Wani who remained underground for some time and later 
fled to Saudi Arabia. Azam Inquillabi bid fare-well to politics and 
joined Government Service as a teacher. Tajamul Islam also went 
underground and if reports are to be relied upon settled in Iran. 
During these years, one would occasionally come across a press 
release from these organisations demanding that those arrested 
under Public Safety Act, be set free. It was only after the death of 
Sheikh Abdullah that the secessionist groups got momentum. Azam 
Inquillabi in his book Qual-i-Faisal advocated for separation of 
Kashmir. He resigned from Government Service to join Mahaz-i-
Azadi(Liberation Front) founded by a veteran Kashmiri leader and 
erstwhile confident of the Sheikh, Sofi Mohammad Akbar. 
Political developments during 1982-1989 
Farooq Abdullah succeeded his father as Chief Minister of 
the state and in his very first address to the National Conference 
legislature party, he declared that he was a Kashmiri and would 
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remain a Kashmiri. He described Kashmir's bond with India as 
unbreakable". He assured that he would defend with all his might 
Article 370 of the Constitution." The first acid test of Farooq's 
ability to satisfy Kashmiri nationalism against centre's attempts to 
dilute the states autonomy was the controversial Resettlement Bill 
which was introduced in the Assembly on September 23, 1982. 
However, despite strong opposition, the bill was readopted by both 
the Houses of the Assembly on October 4,1982 and on 
October 6,1982. Governor B.K.Nehru gave his assent. But the 
Union Government referred it to the Supreme Court for its legal 
opinion. The passing of the bill was, in fact, a major political 
victory for Farooq. Being a popular piece of legislation, it was 
endorsed by even those persons who were hitherto opposing the 
National Conference's policies. These included Jamat-i-Islami chief 
Syed Ali Shah Gelani, the Chairman of the people's Conference, 
Abdul Gani Lone, the leader of the Inquillabi National Conference, 
Ibrahim Dhar and the state Janta leader Abdul Rashid Kabli. On the 
other hand it was bitterly criticised by the traditional alley of the 
Nation Conference, the Congress.^'' In the meantime, elections to 
the State Assembly were held in June 1983. The thrust of Farooq 
Abdullah's election campaign was directed at the Congress-I which 
he alleged, has indulged in communalism and regionalism. He 
warned the Union Government against its attempts to erode the state 
autonomy and emphasized that the National Conference alone could 
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uphold the autonomous status of the State.^ ^ Mrs. Gandhi herself 
campaigned for Congress against the National Conference She 
conducted an aggressive campaign with a distinct pro-Hidu bias so 
much so that a leader like L.K. Advani stated that, 'Indira Gandhi 
played the Hindu card in the Jammu and Kashmir elections in 
1983'.^* The National Conference swept the polls in the valley and 
grabbed eight seats in Jammu. It secured 47 seats while the 
Congress could manage only 26, which established the credentials 
of Farooq Abdullah. 
The Resettlement Bill and the election outcome increased 
bitterness between the Congress and Farooq, which increased 
further when Abdullah convened a conclave with sixteen opposition 
parties at Srinagar on October 5, 1983 to discuss Union-State 
Relationships. The Srinagar conclave was an important milestone in 
the history of autonomy of Indian States. According to Farooq 
Abdullah, the conclave sought to usher a new era, through its demand 
for an effective autonomy for the Indian States and the desire for 
setting up of a real federation in India. Referring to Article 356 and 
357, Farooq charged that these provisions of the Indian 
Constitution 'were an antithesis to the concept of federal polity 
and, as such, needed to be abrogated." This annoyed Indira 
Ghandhi^* who was bent upon undermining states ruled by non-
Congress parties. The ouster of Farooq became imminent. The 
Stadium incident wherein, the Indian Cricket Team was hooted while 
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playing against West Indies, provided the much needed opportunity 
to tarnish the image of Farooq Abdullah by depicting him as 
secessionist and anti-national." The bombardment of Golden 
temple, on June 6, 1984 led to widespread violence by Sikhs against 
Hindu temples in the State. The entire blame was put on Farooq by 
the Congress. The Governor, Jagmohan, provided the finishing touch 
by persuading 12 members of the National Conference to declare 
their support to G.M. Shah. Farooq was dismissed and G.M. Shah 
was installed as the new Chief Minister, who continued in the office 
till 6 March, 1986 which was followed by President's Rule till 
March, 1987 elections. 
The announcement of elections brought Rajiv and Farooq to 
an electoral understanding resulting in the Rajiv-Farooq Accord. 
Dissatisfied with both the Congress and the National Conference, 
the Muslim United Front (MUF) was formed.*° And soon, it became 
a force to reckon with. But thanks to mass-ragging in elections, the 
Congress-National Conference combine emerged victorious.*' The 
newly formed organization, the ( MUF), was badly defeated which 
created discontent in its rank and file. Apprehensions were raised 
that fair and free elections in the State is still a distant dream.*^ 
The anti-Farooq movement begain gaining momentum. 
The political analysts agree that one main factor responsible 
for the sudden growth of militancy in Kashmir was the manner in 
which the 1987 Assembly elections were held in Jammu and 
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Kashmir. It is an open secret that majority of the youth who are at 
present involved in the militant movement, directly or indirectly, 
took an active part in the election campaign. They were in the 
forefront of the campaign launched by the newly born Muslim 
United Front, a loose alliance of about a dozen small parties and 
other groups. But the politics of convinience, the detention of 
political opponents under the Public Safety Act, lack of job avenues, 
corruption and such other factors alienated sizeable number of 
population from the mainstream and they sought refuge with the 
pro-Pakistani elements, who were too glad to welcome them in their 
outfits. It gave a new impetus to such groups.*^ They got the first 
opportunity during the Eid Prayers on May 29, 1987, to create 
pandemonium and fear psychosis among people. It made the Chief 
Minister to leave the Eid-gah abruptly without even delivering the 
customary speech. What was surprising was, that the National 
Conference and the Awami Action Committee choosed the Eid gah 
to settle their scores with members of the Muslim United Front. 
Soon these disturbances also spread to other areas.*'' These 
incidents had a demoralizing effect on the people especially the 
Youth. This explains their crossing over the border. 
The pathetic case of Aijaz Dar, who was killed when he made 
an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Kashmir Police Chief A.M. 
Watali, is one such illustration of the misguided youth. Aijaz Dar 
was one of the prominent activists of MUF who took active part in 
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the election campaign. He was arrested right inside the 
counting hall when the counting of votes for Amirakadal 
Constituency, from where Ghulam Mohiuddin was declared elected, 
was still in progress. It is said that Aijaz Ahmad Dar was beaten up 
by Shah inside the Shergardhi police station where he was lodged 
and that too in presence of Senior police officers including Watali. 
Later he was detained under Public Safety Act. After his release, he 
disappeared and nothing was heard about him till he was shot dead 
by the security guards of Mr. Watali. Aijaz Dar's case is not a 
solitary incident and there are so many Aijas Dars in the rank and 
file of the armed militants*' The valley has witnessed a series of 
militant acts between 1989 and 1990 which took a toll of 561 lives 
as is evident from the following table."^ 
Nature of 
Millitant 
act 
Explo.si(in 
Armed Attflck 
Mob Violence 
Police Firing 
1988 
incidents Killed 
24 15 
7 1 
.190 31 
52 13 
1989 
Incidents 
506 
122 
2154 
273 
Killed 
7 
24 
94 
40 
1990 
Incidents 
40.1 
156 
1077 
118 
Killed 
2 
56 
152 
126 
The JKSLF claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and 
subsequent murder of the General Manager of the Hindustan 
Machine Tools Limited, Srinagar and the Vice Chancellor of the 
Kashmir University and his Private Secretary in April 1990. 
Mujahedeen Kashmir claimed responsibility for various bomb blasts 
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in the valley. By the end of 1990, the situation in the valley had 
become very grim. One thousand two hundred and twenty five 
(1225) including 125 security personnel were killed in 1990. Those 
killed included 294 militants and 606 civilians. Seventy militants 
were arrested and 3282 surrendered apart from the recovery of 
1208 AK 47 rifles, 707 pistols and revolvers, 84 general purpose 
machine guns, 129 rocket launchers, 2636 hand grenades and 
262089 rounds of ammunition.^' 
The trend of the militant activities suggests that their effort 
was to totally disrupt the political process and to paralyze the state 
administration in order to achieve their objective. Use of 
sophisticated firearms and more extensive use of explosives 
transformed the situation. Selective explosions were carried to 
create an atmosphere of terror and panic. Infiltration of Pakistani 
trained Kashmiri youths gained momentum. The year 1989 also saw 
a number of agitations by various secessionist groups. The 
kidnapping of Rubia Syed daughter of the then Home Minister of 
India, Mufti Mohammad Syed on December 2, 1989 was the one 
incident which succeeded in focussing attention of the nation on 
militancy in Kashmir.lt was one of the most daring acts, 
successfully carried out by JKLF militants and clearly demonstrated 
that militancy had resurfaced in the valley in a big way. Rubia was 
released from custody in exchange of five militants from jails, 
which further boasted the morale of the militants. Simultaneously 
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the reformist movement since mid 1989 led by JEI (J & K) and its 
front organizations like Hizb-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahedeen 
provided increasing support to the movement. 
The situation created total panic in the valley resulting in the 
mass exodus of non-Muslims by February end. Around thirty 
thousand families of Hindus migrated from the valley to safer 
places in Jammu and other places in the country till the end of 
March 1999. Even the promulgation of Governor's rule on January 
19, 1990, hardly made an impact on the activities of the militants. 
They resorted to subtle methods like holding peaceful 
demonstrations, disruption of public meetings etc. 
Pattern of militancy in J & K 
As we know that in 1987, the National Conference fought the 
Assembly elections in alliance with Congress (I) though it won the 
elections, it lost political credibility. It is almost an established fact 
now that there was large-scale rigging during these elections to keep 
the Muslim United Front out of power,^ * But then the MUF had 
acquired quite a clout and the young people who had campaigned for 
it, felt betrayed. They came to the conclusion that power cannot be 
gained in J & K through the democratic process. They turned to the 
secessionists for solace and raised the banner of revolt against what 
was termed as 'Indian Imperialism'. The discrimination against 
political opponents by the State further drove these people into the 
open arms of secessionists and militants.*'The secessionist talked 
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of an independent State but the militants wanted merger with 
Pakistan but none of these groups wanted to continue with India. 
The stage was thus set for a violent struggle between these groups 
and the Government. There were protests against every possible 
issue, for example, the agitation against shortage of power led to 
indiscriminate use of Police force. At least half a dozen people 
were killed by police firing. This became a rallying point for the 
militants to start a violent struggle against the Government. 
Heralded by bomb blasts, militancy was writ large on the Kashmiri 
scene. Anti-Indian propaganda, hurling of Pakistani flag, burning of 
the 'tricolour', became the order of the day. Violence became a 
norm of protest, which could be evoked any time. Zia's death in an 
air crash caused major disturbances. Protest against Salman 
Rushdie's book 'Satanic Verses' got mixed up with the protests with 
' Bandhs ' to commemorate the hanging of Maqbool Bhat, and a 
highly volatile situation prevailed in the valley. The State 
Government remained either a helpless spectator or resorted to 
brutal repression, leading to further deterioration. 
The political process and rule of law became things of the 
past. Anti-Indian sentiments in the Kashmir valley had mounted to a 
high pitch by the end of 1988. From all accounts, the secessionists 
had managed to bring the administrative machinery to a stand still, 
the mass mobilization of the population against the State 
Government and the marked deterioration of law and order had 
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completely demoralized the State apparatus. The law and order 
machinery lost its credibility. The secessionists argued that Farooq 
Abdullah rigged the elections in alliance with the Hindu Congress 
to keep the Muslims of the J & K valley enslaved, erode the 
Kashmiri identity and rob the wealth of the State for himself and his 
family. There is, thus, no alternative left for the Muslims of J & K 
but to get together and wage a Holy War against the oppressors.'° 
JKLF and Ansanil-Islam super-headed the movement initially. 
They aimed to shake the foundations of the State Government 
through militant attacks, protests and agitations. This crisis is 
largely a product of lack of political insight, indifference of the 
powers that be to the legitimate demands of the people, brutal use 
of force to suppress all dissent etc. etc. The situation was a 
manifestation of the accumulated anger of the Kashmiri's and not 
just a reaction to a particular incident. An editorial team of the 
Indian Defence Review traced the turmoil in the valley to different 
phases. *" 
Phase I ( 1987 to mid 1988) 
During this phase, large number of Kashmiri youth crossed 
the actual Line of Control to receive training in Azad Kashmir and 
to induct arms and ammunition into the valley. This remained largely 
unnoticed by the security forces. No military operations were 
instituted during this period, by the militants. 
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Phase II ( mid 1988 to April 1990) 
The intensity of militancy related episodes increased. The 
secessionist leadership got inspiration from similar groups 
especially in East Europe, which managed to achieve their 
objectives through the use of force and intimidation. 
Phase III (May to Aug. 1990) 
It witnessed mass migration of the Kashmiri Hindu 
Community to Jammu and other parts of India. 
Phase IV ( Sep. 1990 to mid 1991) 
The militants became very active by indulging in the 
destruction of public property such as schools, bridges. Government 
buildings, buses etc. The intention was to undermine the 
Government's authority by destroying the basic administrative 
infrastructure through which it could reach the people. 
Phase V ( mid 1991 to fall 1992) 
During this period the militancy aspects of the movement 
were further refined and polished. Targets were selected for attacks 
with mathematical accuracy and operational capability. 
Phase VI ( Winter 1992 to winter 1993) 
During this period Pakistan accelerated its anti-India 
campaign by targeting the military posts on the Line of Control. 
India responded to these attacks by causing heavy causalities on the 
Pakistani side and losing considerable men themselves. Artillery 
duels in place of small arms exchanges, on the Line of Control, 
further worsened the situation. 
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Phase VII (from Oct. 1992 onwards) 
The militant operations had acquired a new identity with 
Pakistan losing its grip over the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the 
creation of a holy mercenary force to fight against the Indian 
Security Forces. A systematic campaign to boost up the morale of 
the Kashmiri militants, which was on decline due to loss of lives at 
the hands of Indian security forces, was launched to mobilize the 
public opinion in the valley. 
Phase VIII ( Hazratbal Siege and the Charar-e-Sharief fiasco) 
The Hazratbal and the Charar-e-Sharief episodes created 
suspicion in the minds of the people about the bonafides of the 
security forces and the Indian Government and in the process, the 
militants got the sympathy of the people. A report for the US 
Congress by its Research Service, (the CRS) sums up the initial 
events leading to militancy beginning in early 1990, tensions 
increased significantly as India sent more than 1,50,000 security 
forces into the State in response to an increasing militant Muslim 
secessionist movement which it contended was being armed and 
trained by Pakistan. As of mid-1991, India had become ever more 
critical of alleged Pakistani interference, Pakistan for its part 
claims to provide only moral support for the right of Kashmiri 
Muslims. However, the indisputable flow of arms into Kashmir and 
Pakistan's public calls for holding a plebiscite under United 
Nation's Resolutions, adopted in 1948 are viewed by many in India 
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as a major threat to the status quo.^ ^ 
Between January. 1988 and March 1989, 61 blasts were 
witnessed by the valley in which 18 people lost their lives." This 
was acknowledged by Farooq Abdullah during the question hour in 
the Assembly. According his statement 194 people were injured in 
these blasts including 18 policemen. According to data furnished by 
the Jammu and Kashmir Association, more than 16,000 youth were 
arrested between April 1990 and Dec. 1991 alone. During the month 
of October 1988 alone, 27 trained youths were arrested and 17 
kalashankofs, 60 magazines, 74 bullets, 3760 revolvers and pistols, 
7 bombs, 77 kg. pencil bombs, 3 detonators, 2 bundles of fuse wire, 
1 telescope, 600 strikes, 6 booklets, 5 posters were recovered.''' 
Two particular events had a great impact on the events that 
were to follow in the valley. The first was the kidnapping of Rubaiya 
Sayed, the daughter of the then Home Minister, Mufti Mohd. Sayed, 
who was released in exchange for jailed Kashmiri Militants by the 
then Coalition National Front Government in New Delhi, 
legitimatising kidnappings which became common there after.'^  The 
second was the killing of many innocent civilians accompanying the 
funeral procession of Maulana Mohammed Farooq, the Mirwaiz. The 
Mirwiz was shot dead on 21st. May 1990. As his funeral made its 
way through some of the narrow lanes of Srinagar, a group of CRPF 
policemen opened fire on a crowed of some 4,000 people, though 
official statements said 57 people had died but the locals claimed 
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that 117 had died. The reckless and unprovoked firing by the CRPF 
infuriated the people and the situation went out of control of the 
authorities. The battle-lines had from now been clearly drawn 
between the Kashmiris (the militants) and the might of the Indian 
Security Forces.^* From 1990 onwards, there was a mushroom 
increase in the Tanzeems, between 100 and 200 became active in 
the State of Jammu & Kashmir. 
The Government of India responded to activities of the 
militants with a heavy hand and in the process many innocents were 
also put to hardships. The worst victims were the members of the 
JKLF, which was heading the movement and openly advocated for an 
independent Kashmir. This was obviously against Pakistan's agenda 
of including Kashmir in its fold. With the arrest of the prominent 
leaders of the JKLF, a vacuum was created which was filled in by 
Pro-Pakistan Fundamentalist Organization, the Hizbul Mujahideen. 
Since then, a series of incidents rocked the valley. The kidnapping 
of 6 foreign tourists in 1995 (from the US, UK, Germany and 
Norway) once again brought Kashmir in the world news. The 
Government accused the militant groups notably 'Al-Faran' for the 
ugly incident while the militants blamed the Government for 
kidnapping and in the accusations and counter accusations, the truth 
could not be found out even to this day. The Ayodya fiasco and the 
subsequent rioting further generated a sense of insecurity and 
alienation among the large Muslim population of India more so in 
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Kashmir. By March 1994 itself over 7,000 people had been killed 
in Kashmir of which over 1,000 were from the security forces, 
Government officials, politicians etc. There were about 700 
incidents of kidnappings. The destruction of property has put aside 
decades of development in Kashmir. 
The Year 1998 was no better. About 999 militants were 
killed by the security forces, including 51 who were killed on the 
Line of Control and 948 in different encounters and operations. 
During the same period, 1228 militants were apprehended in 
different operations while 187 surrendered before the security 
forces. 529 militants were released after preliminary questioning 
and 457 booked under TADA and other emergency laws. As many as 
128 persons were arrested under Section-169. Cr. P.C. Five hundred 
and fourteen persons were detained under the Public Security Act. 
During year under review, the militants carried out 1181 attacks on 
security forces. The security forces recovered 1520 AK rifles 
during the period under review while 584 pistols, 71 universal 
machine guns, 7 carbines, 104 Rocket projectile guns, 7 light 
machine guns, 7 - 303 rifles, 24 sniper rifles, 140 rocket launchers 
and 293 rocket boosters were recovered during the year. The 
recovery of ammunition included 1.70 Lakh rounds of A.K. rifles, 
58734 revolvers, 5791 UMG, 6510 of snapper rifles, 12 of 303 
rifles, 80091of rounds of belted ammunition were also recovered 
during the period under review. The security forces also recovered 
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5883 grenades, 514 lEDs, 2922 explosive devices, 614 electric 
detonators, 5511 detonators, 471 anti-personal mines, 70 anti-tank 
mines and 375 rockets during the period.'^ In the Kashmir valley 
over the last decade the security forces recovered weapons worth 
Rs.30 crores. The arms seized by army alone include 12155 A.K. 
assault riffles,755 machine guns,623 rocket projectile guns (RPGs) 
195 sniper riffles,3973 pitols-revolvers,25 mortars, 1160 radio sets 
besides huge quantities of explosives. It amounts to 75% of total 
arms seized in the Kashmir valley so far. The rest of the arms have 
been seized by other security forces agencies'^. The killings and 
counter killings and the terror let loose by the militants and 
security forces have made the lives of innocent citizens miserable 
and retarded all development activities in the state. The political 
leadership has shown lack of foresight and sagacity in dealing with 
the situation. Fake encounters, indiscriminate killings, kidnappings, 
arson cannot provide any solution to the problem, as is evident since 
past one and half decade. The remedy lies in opening a dialogue with 
the various militant outfits. However, the multiplicity of these 
organizations and lack of coordination among them has made the 
task of dialogue and negotiations difficult. Therefore it becomes 
imperative to identify these organizations before initiating the 
process of dialogue. The involvement of Pakistan in such exercises 
also seems to be a desideratumion. The press, public, human rights 
organizations should also be involved in these exercises to bring 
about normalcy in the valley. 
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MEASURES TO COMBAT MILITANCY 
Terrorism and militancy is not confined to the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir alone. It has assumed international dimensions absorbing 
in its fold several states. Even the terrorist movements which are 
purely domestic, if left unchecked, is bound to draw the attention of 
other states out of sympathy, expediency or simply to further aggravate 
the situation to destabilise the affected state, politically and 
economically. It is, therefore, necessary to nip the mischief in the bud. 
Terrorism and militancy, whatever be its form and manifestation have 
threatened peace and security and have put the human lives and 
fundamental ifreedoms in danger. 
.\part from the efforts at national level, the fight against 
terrorism requires international cooperation. There have been 
innumerable transitional conventions to try to formalize strategies at 
the Government level, but Governments remain too hamstrung by self-
interest to cooperate effectively. The most effective anti-terrorist 
collaborations are the informal, everyday links between police forces 
and intelligence services. In an era of globalization and increasing 
interdependence, almost every significant terrorist campaign has an 
international dimension, even when it is mounting a challenge to a 
specific government within its own territory. There were attempts to 
deal with terrorism on a global basis as early as 1930s. In 1937, the 
League of Nations, drafted two conventions. The first prescribed acts 
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of terrorism, which included attempts on the lives of heads of state 
or their spouses and other government representatives .The first 
convention also prohibited acts of international terrorism involving 
injury to persons or damages to property committed by citizens of one 
state against citizens of another. The other Convention set up an 
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over terrorist crimes. 
They, however, failed to create any impact on the world community and 
only 13 states had ratified these conventions. The U.N. carried further 
the work of the League of Nations to foster world peace and security 
and impress upon the Member states, the need to create an atmosphere 
in which people can enjoy rights and freedoms. The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, in addition to guaranteeing liberty and 
the security of the persons, also states " no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment". 
The right to enjoy 'freedom from fear' is stressed in the preambles of 
both the International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, 
and the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UN 
Convention on Genocide further stressed human dignity irrespective 
of race, religion, nationality etc. Again the UN Declaration on 
Principles of International Law calls upon the states to refrain from' 
organizing, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist 
acts in another state. It also lays down that all states have a 'duty to 
promote.... the principleVefTel? -detefmih^tion .... in order to bring a 
speedy end to colo^i^alism..,,' and that ^ev r^y state has the duty to 
- :^6-f?/ 
.^ : /' 
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refrain from any forcible action which deprive people .... of their right 
to self determination' . The Declaration continues: ' in their actions 
against, and resistance to such forcible action in pursuit of their right 
to self determination, such people are entitled to seek and to receive 
support'. Militancy and terrorism are often resorted to under the garb 
of the right of self-determination to mobilise world public opinion. 
This is precisely what is happening in Kashmir. For example, the 
Munich Olympics Massacre of 1972, saw a clear split between those 
states wishing UN to condemn and act against factional terrorism and 
those states wanting to legalize such terrorism as a justifiable means 
of political struggle. In December 1973, the UN General Assembly 
did, however, adopt a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, which has been ratified by number of States. There 
was also serious thinking in the area of hijacking of aircrafts. The 
1970 Hague Convention requires signatories either to extradite 
apprehended hijackers to their country of origin, or to prosecute them 
under the judicial code of their native state. The Montreal Convention 
of 1971 extended the Scope of international law to encompass 
sabotage and attacks on airports and ground aircrafts. Substantial 
progress has been made in the field of international cooperation in 
Western Europe, which often witnessed terrorist attacks. The European 
Union (EU) Ministers of the Interior, and the police forces and 
intelligence services of member states, have since 1976 developed a 
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machinery for discussion and multilateral cooperation. However, the 
most ambitious attempt at European cooperation on terrorism at the 
judicial level took place in 1977. The Council of Europe, a body of 23 
European countries was set up in 1949 to achieve greater mutual unity, 
to facilitate social and economic progress and to maintain human rights 
and basic fundamental freedoms. 
The Council of Europe's Convention on the suppression of 
terrorism was signed by 17 of its member countries in January 1977. 
Ratifying states agreed to exclude the whole range of major terrorist 
offences (such as assassination, hostage taking and hijacking) from the 
political offense exception clauses that has been previously used to 
justify a state's refusal to extradite terrorists. One of the most 
effective means to curb terrorism takes the form of bilateral 
agreements between neighbouring states. A notable instance of this 
occurred in the U.S. Cuba Hijacked Pact of February 1973, in which 
both governments agreed to return hijacked aircraft, crews, passengers 
and hijackers. A similar agreement between India and Pakistan seems 
to be an imperative to check and prevent the militant acts in Kashmir. 
In Europe also, bilateral security cooperation is being developed in 
areas particularly hard hit by terrorist violence over the past one 
decade. The joint effort of France and Spain to combat Basque 
nationalist terrorism is an example in which counter-terrorist 
collaboration has been highly effective. This cooperation has led to 
the dismantling of ETA's network in France. In 1991, 40 ETAD 
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members, both Spanish and French, were arrested in France and the 
following year the French and Spanish police arrested three terrorist 
leaders and 199 terrorists and collaborators, thereby totally disrupting 
ETA's financial and logistical support. There is no reason why such 
bilateral cooperation can not be evolved between India and Pakistan on 
the lines of TREVI. The TREVI (International Terrorism, Radicalism, 
Extremism and Violence) which was established in 1976, for 
exchanging intelligence and coordinating efforts of the European 
Union against crime and terrorism. It provides a mechanism for 
developing informal collaboration and exchange of information 
between national police and intelligence officials. Police and 
intelligence co-operation is generally most effective at the bilateral 
level especially when there is a considerable degree of personal trust 
between the officials involved .It is bound to create a culture of 
international cooperation. Such type of cooperation is awfully lacking 
among EU member states, the need for enhanced cooperation on 
security issues, including terrorism, was given added urgency with the 
Single European Act of 1986, which aimed at the establishment of an 
European Internal market. In preparation for this, the govenmients of 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherland and Luxembourg signed the 
Schengen Agreement (which came into effect in 1994), committing 
them to dismantling controls on their common borders. Their plan was 
to enable free movement of persons, goods and services across their 
mutual borders while simultaneously strengthening their external 
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borders. 
This created concerns over controlling trans-European terrorist 
activity. During the 1970's collaboration between terrorist groups such 
as the Badder Meinh of Gang and the Italian Red Brigades had worked 
to deadly effect. The establishment of satisfactory computer link 
between nation police forces and arrangements for the hot pursuits of 
criminals and terrorists should help prevent such problems in future. 
Such arrangements are lacking in the entire South Asian region, 
whether it is India-Pakistan or India-Sri Lanka or Pakistan-Bangladesh. 
The SAARC could have been an asset in this regard but it is 
hoodwinked by the provision that bilateral issues cannot be taken up. It 
is all the more disturbing that barring this region efforts at multilateral 
cooperation are being attempted all our the world. At the meeting of 
G-7 States and Russia at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in Canada, in June 1995, 
the political leaders called for a Special Counter-Terrorism 
Conference of Ministers to prevent use of nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons by the terrorists. This was in part, a response to 
the nerve gas attack by the Shrinr-Kyu cult on the Tokyo subway system 
on March 20, 1995. There were also new initiatives on the protection 
of aviation, maritime and other forms of transportation, and measures 
to prevent the falsification of documents. Moreover the Conference 
pledged to work toward universal adherence to international treaties 
and conventions on terrorism by the 2000. 
The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Pitzhak Rabin 
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by a Jewish extremist in November 1996, and the Hamas Suicide 
bombings against Israel in 1996 provided the catalyst for further 
summits on strengthening international cooperation. The theme was at 
the top of the agenda of the 1996 meetings in Lyon, France, where 
President Clinton presented 40US initiatives for enhancing Counter 
terrorism. The G-7 summit held three-day Ministerial Meeting on 
Countering Terrorism in Paris in July 1996. And it was agreed that 
there should be coordination in intelligence work, treaties facilitating 
the extradition of suspect terrorists, establishment of a directory of 
counter terrorism skills etc. Militancy and terrorism can not be 
tackled single handedly. It calls for bilateral and multilateral efforts, 
shedding political differences between and among nations, to save 
humanity from further destruction. 
Terrorism and UN 
The Seventh United Nations Congress on the prevention of 
crime and the treatment of offenders, which met in Milan from 26 
August to September 1985, were deeply disturbed by the prevalence 
of actual or threatened violent attacks and other concerted acts of 
violence against innocent persons and agreed that terrorist activities 
including kidnapping, murders, hijacking, the taking of hostages, and 
the destruction of property seriously impair freedom and the political 
stability of communities. These acts continue to persist despite 
numerous International Conventions like the one on Offences And 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the Convention For 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
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the Convention on the Prevention And Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic agents, and the 
International Convention Against the taking of Hostages. 
Gravely concerned at the human, social and economic cost of 
such attacks and the threat they posed to normal international 
intercourse particularly in the areas of travel, commerce and 
diplomatic relations and bearing in mind the importance of safeguards 
and maintenance of basic rights under ordinary legal procedures and in 
conformity with international human rights standards, the Congress 
called upon the Member states to take necessary measures to ensure 
full observance of the obligations contained in the relevant 
Conventions to which they are parties.' 
The congress also appealed to those states that are not parties 
to these conventions to join them and adopt legislation within their 
own countries to strengthen the law against such offenders. It also 
called upon the state to rationalize their extradition procedures and 
practices and other cooperative arrangements within their respective 
legal processes and to avoid inappropriate exceptions. The terrorist 
acts have been vociferously condemned by a number of forums, time 
and again. Most recently, the commission on Human Pjghts vide 
Resolution 1994/46, the Sub-commission on prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities vide Resolution 48/122 
and 49/185, expressed their condemnation of terrorism. In its 
Resolution 49/185, the General Assembly noted the growing 
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connection between the terrorist groups and the illegal traffic in arms 
and drugs, as well as the consequent commission of serious crimes 
such as murder, kidnapping, assault and robbery. 
MEASURES TO COMBAT MILITANCY IN KASHMIR 
It is not that the militancy has surfaced in the Valley all of a 
sudden. The seeds of militancy in Kashmir were sown in the very 
beginning. The manner in which the Dogras ruled the State and 
subjected the Muslims to repression, depression and exploitation, 
the manner in which Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession 
with India, the empty promise of a plebiscite, the manner in which 
subsequent elections to Parliament and State Assembly were held, 
the political horse-trading of the leaders, and above all politics of 
convenience and corruption, paved the way for a steady growth and 
development of militancy in the Valley. The lopsided policies of the 
Union-Government and the unprincipled compromises of the State 
Government with the political parties in Kashmir, added fuel to the 
fire. The Congress Government, which was in power at the Union 
and its proteges in the State miserably failed to meet the hopes and 
aspirations of the people. The problems of poverty, illiteracy and 
unemployment could hardly generate an atmosphere of goodwill 
between the rulers and the ruled. It is a pity that such stalwarts like 
Nehru and Indra Gandhi failed to inspire confidence among the 
people of the valley, inspite of their Kashmiri origin. Pakistan, the 
archenemy of India, began flexing its muscles to woo the 
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disgruntled elements in the valley. It never hesitated in providing 
moral and material support to these elements, to pursue its own 
nefarious designs. In the process, obviously, India-Pakistan relation 
further deteriorated. The cosmetic touches provided by frequent 
India-Pakistan dialogue, Vajpayee's visit to Lahore and the 
superficial pleasantries exchanged between the leaders of the two 
countries could hardly cure he Melady. The Kargil war, the over 
throw of the Nawaz Shrief Govt, and the coming into power of 
military regime in Pakistan further blurred the relationship and the 
situation in Kashmir became more grim day by day. 
Militancy in Kashmir, thus did not surface overnight. In fact 
it was dormant till 1987 and the elections of 1987 provided a new 
impetus to the disgruntled forces who believed, which was true to 
large extent, that elections were manipulated^ and the entire 
democratic process has been reduced to a farce. The large scale 
rigging of the elections gave the impression that these exercises in 
democracy are nothing but a conspiracy against the laity. The youth 
especially felt betrayed and it seemed that they had lost their 
confidence in the democratic apparatus, which was abused and 
misused by all political parties, the National Conference being the 
biggest beneficiary, to their own political advantage. Disgusted, 
majority of the Kashmiri youth crossed over the border to get 
training in the use of arms and ammunition in order to wage a war 
against the authority which in their opinion had no legitimacy to 
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rule over them. They did not realize that Pakistan is no friend of 
theirs. And the irony is neither the Union Government nor the State 
Government could prevent them from falling into Pakistan's trap. 
I* Deployment of Security Forces, Fencing of Border and 
Enactment of Emergency Legislation 
The Government of India and the Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir got activated only when the situation, became explosive and 
security arrangements were beefed up along the Line of Control to 
check the growing infiltration. The security patrolling was made 
more regular. A 500-metre defence belt was identified and the 
security forces undertook the responsibility of fencing the border. 
According to Government Reports, from Kuthwa to Punjab and 
Tangdar, security vigil was intensified and in border areas security 
pickets were installed. In Ranbir Singh Pora and Ramgarah border 
areas, BSF was deployed. A ban was also imposed on the free 
movement of vehicles in the adjoining areas of the border.^ Dusk to 
dawn curfew was imposed in the five kilometer belt of the Line of 
Actual Control and Indo-Pak border throughout the State to check 
the transborder movement of militants/ All these efforts could 
help in reducing the rate of infiltration but could not check it 
altogether. In the wake of the sporadic increase in the militancy 
related incidents in Srinagar city such as frequent bomb blasts which 
rocked the Srinagar city and cross firing incidents, stringent 
measures were taken to strengthen the security of governmental. 
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semi-governmental and non-governmental establishments of public 
importance including Courts. Entry to these establishments was 
restricted. Every visitor is questioned and checked by the security 
personnel and his name and address was entered in the register.^ 
Keeping in view the deteriorating law and order situation in the 
valley. Section-144 was promulgated in the Srinagar city on 
September 5, 1998 for a period of two months according to which 
no meeting could be held without the prior permission of the 
District Magistrate and five or more than five people could not 
assemble at a place. A ban was also imposed on all religious and 
political processions.^ In the mean time, Central Cabinet Secretary 
T.N. Session visited the State on September 7, 1989 in order to 
make an assessment of the then prevailing law and order situation in 
the valley. After long deliberations with the Chief Minister, Farooq 
Abdullah, and taking cognisance of the increasing militancy related 
incidents recommended the division of the State into different 
sectors and deployment of police force in greater numbers.' Until 
1990, several political leaders, security personnel, prominent 
figures including two media men, were among 1200 people killed in 
the disturbances in the valley leading to the huge deployment of 
security forces in the valley." BSF, CRPF, the ITBP and RR (Special 
Units of the Indian Army trained in counter insurgency activities) 
whose number mounted to more than 400000 were thus deployed in 
the valley, turning the State more or less into a cantonment.' The 
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security forces have been most frequently blamed for human rights 
violation such as custodial killings, torture and fake encounters. 
Since the early 1990, Amnesty International has in all its reports on 
Jammu and Kashmir expressed its resentment over human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the army and paramilitary forces.'° Human 
rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, torture leading to 
hundreds of deaths in custody, and extra judicial executions 
perpetrated by the Police, Armed forces and Paramilitary Forces 
soared in the 1990's. These forces were reported to have taken 
hundreds of civilians hostage and has tortured and killed hundreds 
of unarmed civilians." Thus, the deployment of security forces 
caused further alienation of the people who became the victims of 
the State terrorism. It has proved counter productive and instead of 
combating militancy, it further aggravated the problem. In order to 
cope with the rising tide of militancy, the newly installed National 
Front Government changed State Governor, K.V. Krishna Rao and 
appointed Jagmohan as his successor. This was strongly resented by 
Farooq Abdullah who was heading the National Conference-
Congress 1 coalition government. Farooq tendered his resignation 
in protest on January 18, 1990. The next day the State was placed 
under Governor's rule with Jagmohan at the helm of affairs. 
Jagmohan adopted repressive measures to curb militancy in the 
State. Major political leaders and activists suspected of 
collaborating with the agitated youth were arrested. Jagmohan's 
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tenure, however, proved short-lived as the Union Government 
decided to recall him following CRPF firing on the funeral 
procession of Awami Action Committee Chairman, Maulana 
Mirwaiz Farooq by some unidentified gunmen on May 21, 1990. 
J.C.Saxena, succeeded Jagmohan, who proceeded cautiously, but as 
militancy showed no sign of abating, the Disturbed Area Act was 
promulgated in the valley and 75 kms of Poonch and Rajouri areas 
on July 4, 1990. The Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 1992 
gives powers to police in areas declared " disturbed" by the state 
government, similar to those conferred on army and paramilitary 
forces under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. In such areas, 
any magistrate or police officer of an inspector rank, if he 
considers it necessary, may "fire upon or otherwise use force even 
to the causing of death of any person," who is committing any act 
which may result in a serious breach of public order (Section 4), 
such personnel are also empowered to destroy arms dumps or 
fortified positions or shelters (Section 5). Section 6 gives legal 
immunity to persons acting under the Act: "no suit or prosecution 
shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the 
Government against any person in respect of any thing done or 
purporting to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by 
Section 4&5". When Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 
1992 was about to lapse in October 1997, the debate was reopened 
whether there was any need for special laws in Jammu and Kashmir 
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under an elected civilian Government and given official claims of 
an improved law and order situation. On October 1997, the State 
Assembly unanimously passed the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed 
Areas Act, 1997 to remain in force for one year more. It is identical 
to the 1992 Act but for two amendments. It is mandatory for a 
police officer to report to the nearest magistrate within 24 hours 
the cause of death or injury of any person, caused while acting under 
Section 4 of the Act, and the powers to shoot or to kill earlier 
vested in a head constable are now vested in a sub inspector or 
inspector of police. This was followed by promulgation of an 
ordinance arming the para-military forces with special powers to 
deal with the situation.'^ It provided the Governor with a free hand 
to curb the militancy. The act also vested enormous powers in the 
armed forces.'^ The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958, 
which was introduced in Jammu and Kashmir in December 1990 
declaring 6 districts in the Kashmir Division and two districts in 
Jammu Division as "disturbed areas". It gives the armed and 
paramilitary forces sweeping powers. The Act allows security 
forces in areas declared "disturbed" (Section 3) to "arrest without 
warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or 
against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed 
or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force 
as may be necessary to effect the arrest," including the powers to 
shoot to kill (Section 4). Section 7 indemnifies armed forces from 
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prosecution for any acts done under the Act. One of the most 
notorious laws in force in the State was the Terrorism and 
Disruptive Activities (prevention) Act (TADA), 1987, which gave 
security forces special powers in the use of force, arrest and 
detention'*. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (PSA) 
which is in operation in the state permits administrative detention 
up to a period of two years on vaguely defined grounds to prevent 
people, " from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
the state or the maintenance of public order". Under Section-22, 
legal proceedings against officials for acts "done in good faith" are 
disallowed. Important legal and constitutional safeguards, including 
the right to be brought before a Magistrate within twenty four hours 
of arrest and to consult a lawyer of one's choice, are not available 
to any one held under the Law of Preventive Detention. These 
special laws were promulgated in the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
with the object of vesting powers in the army and other security 
forces agencies necessary to combat militancy. Power corrupts and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely, and subsequently these powers 
were consistently misused and abused. According to the concluding 
observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee at its 
hearing of India's 3 "^. Periodic Report in 1997, 1600 people 
remained in detention under TAD A provisions in 1997. In 1996 the 
Minister of State for Home Affairs, Maqbool Dar in written 
statement to the upper house of parliament stated that in Jammu and 
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Kashmir 482 people were still detained under TADA, however, as 
many detainees from Jammu and Kashmir are lodged outside the 
state. However, there were conflicting reports on TADA detainees, 
for instance, Amnesty International was informed that 35 Kashmiri 
detainees were held under TADA in Jullundar Jail and 117 in 
Jodhpur Jail.'* In August 1997, despite repeated official assertions 
that the state was fast returning to normalcy, the Jammu and 
Kashmir Prevention and Suppression of Sabotage Acts, 1965, 
intended to " provide for the speedy trial of, and enhanced 
punishment for offences of the sabotage, was notified by the State 
Government of the Jammu and Kashmir and came into force under 
SRO (Statutory Rules and Orders) 272 dated 7 August, 1997. Within 
days, a district and sessions judge was appointed to try offences 
under the Act in a designated court in Jammu. Police were 
reportedly instructed on 12 August to book saboteurs under the Act. 
While none, to Amnesty International's knowledge, has so for been 
charged and tried under the Act.'^ All these special laws operative 
in the valley vested enormous powers in the army and other security 
agencies resulting in Human Rights violations on a large scale. 
Custodial killings, fake encounters and disappearances have now 
become part of the life in Kashmir. A.Q. Parray of the Jammu and 
Kashmir High Court observed, in a case of torture allegedly 
perpetrated by the counterinsurgency wing of the state police, that 
the "Police Task Force are still behaving in a way which is neither 
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recognised by law nor is provided by any procedure established by 
law" '^ The security forces including the Jammu and Kashmir 
police have shown a disturbing disregard for the rule of law in their 
expanding counterinsurgency operations leading to increasing 
allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture and killings. These agencies 
have also ignored the constitutional and legal safeguards that 
provide redress to victims and victim's families.'* The first step for 
victims to ensure that a serious human rights abuse is investigated, 
the whereabouts of the prisoner established and those responsible 
brought to justice, is to register a complaint with police. Police 
officers are obliged under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code to take a complainant's statement down in writing in a First 
Investigating Report (FIR). According to Amnesty International 
these rules are often defied in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.'' A 
number of possible reasons for police refusal to file complaints can 
be cited. Police may be afraid of repercussions from an 
organisation they consider more powerful than their own, they often 
do not want to be seen as aiding and abetting the cause of armed 
opposition groups if they do their duty and register complaints 
against security forces. They, thus prefer to be directed by a court 
to register a complaint, without inviting the wrath of either militants 
or security forces. Some times it takes years of persistent efforts 
by relatives to lodge a complaint. 
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II: TWO PRONGED STRATEGY 
The Government of India, in 1996, launched a two pronged 
strategy in an attempt to restore political normalcy in the violence 
ridden Kashmir valley. The first part of the strategy aimed at 
opening negotiations with a group of militants who had recently 
being released from long-term incarceration in Indian prisons. The 
Home Minister S.B. Chawn, along with Home Secretary K. 
Padmanabhiah, initiated these talks in February 1996. Babar Badar 
of the Muslim Janbaz Force, Imran Rahi of the Hizbul Mujahideen, 
Bilal Lodi of the Hurriyat Conference, and Ghulam Mohuddin Lone 
of the Muslim Mujahideen, agreed to hold talks with the 
Government without any pre-conditions. Once the negotiations 
were underway, the militants indicated a willingness to continue 
their discussion with the Government despite their refusal to 
participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.^" However, 
the strategy could not work and failed to provide any solution to the 
Kashmir crisis. The Government then tried the second alternative of 
holding parliamentary elections in Jammu and Kashmir. These 
elections were held between May 7 and May 30, 1996, alongwith 
the Eleventh General Elections in India. The turnout in these 
elections was dramatically higher than in 1989 parliamentary 
elections. In the 1989 elections, voter turnout was about two 
percent^' while in the 1996 elections it was nearly 40%.^ ^ There 
were allegations that the BSF and RR, exerted coercion and 
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intimidation on the voter to vote, which explains partially the high 
turnout.^^ However, the security forces did not attempt to direct 
voters towards any particular party or candidate but their behavior 
did raise apprehensions about the fairness of the elections. 
Although the Government claimed an initial victory against the 
insurgents, its reputation for probity and sincerity of its 
commitment to the democratic process remained tarnished both 
among the residents of the valley as well as outside observers. '^* 
The National Conference which had boycotted the Parliamentary 
elections in May won the State Legislative Assembly elections held 
between September 7 and 30, 1996 with an unprecedented majority, 
Farooq Abdullah, was sworn in as the state's Chief Minister on 
October 9,1996, ending over 6 years of Central Rule. The National 
Conference had won the elections inter-alia on an implicit 
commitment that security operations would again be placed under 
civilian control and on promises to disarm and rehabilitate the so 
called renegades. In October 1997, the Chief Minister announced 
the withdrawal of armed and paramilitary forces from Anantnag and 
Baramullah towns "on experimental bases" with a view to bring 
normalcy in the valley.^ ^ He said law and order operations in these 
areas would henceforth be entrusted to the state police and the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Meanwhile, the state police 
was significantly strengthened and was fully prepared for counter-
insurgency attacks. 
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III: CREATION OF COUNTER INSURGENT GROUPS 
Before the elections of 1996, the Union Government, in a 
bid to undermine the various militant groups, created counter 
militant groups, the most prominent of which is the Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimoon, led by Kukka Parrey, a formal insurgent leader, who 
was provided with money, weapons and protection by the 
government," which created fear and terror among people and has 
proved worst than the militant groups. In due course of time, it 
posed a danger not only to the people but also the Government, 
which created and sponsored it. The move proved counter-
productive, which provided neither short term gains nor long term 
advantages, except securing their own petty interests. Stories of 
excesses committed by these marauders soon became the talk of 
the town. But seldom has one heard an incident when the 
Government or its legal instruments has tried to curb these 
outlaws.^ ^ 
IV: REIN-FORCEMENT OF POLICE FORCE 
In February 1997, Gurbachan Jagat, who had served in various 
capacities relating to counter-insurgency operations in the Punjab 
Police, was appointed Director General of Police in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The police force was reconstituted and its strength 
increased from 38,000 to 50,000 in August 1998.2«Its 
counterinsurgency branch, the Special Operations Group (SOG), 
earlier called Special Task Force, set up in 1994 on a local basis 
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was given more and better communication and transport facilities, 
training by security agencies and supplemented with some 12,000 
Special Police Officers (SPO), local people, including many 
renegades, with good local knowledge and links in the local 
population. In Doda district, armed Village Defence Committees 
(VDC) were set up to defend villages till the security forces take 
charge of the situation. But in the wake of several incidents of 
members of armed opposition groups taking villagers as hostage and 
decamping with VDC arms, the State Government, in June 1998, 
ordered them to be disarmed and replaced by SPOs. Responding to 
targeted killings of Hindu Villagers in the first half of 1998, the 
State Government in August 1998 setup a "three tier security grid" 
in Jammu, involving operational pickets, defence pickets and border 
pickets in Rajoori, Poonch, Doda and Udhampur districts, for which 
an additional 20,000 police personnel, special police officers 
(SPOs) and ex-service men were created." However, in October 
1997, the Director General of Police, Gurbachan Jagat, had to admit 
that the services of the renegades was proving counter productive in 
view of excesses during the operations.^" Acknowledging that " the 
utility of the renegades is over" the Union Government and the 
State Government of Jammu and Kashmir sought to rehabilitate and 
absorb them into the security forces. The Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF) both reportedly 
raised a battalion made up of renegades and some 5,000 renegades 
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were reportedly appointed Special Police Officers (SPOs) in the 
State Police. However, Jammu and Kashmir media reports indicate 
that some renegades still engage in "freelance" criminal activities, 
supported by and loosely attached to different security forces 
agencies.'' 
V: RELEASE OF HURRIYAT LEADERS 
The Government soon realised that peace can not be restored 
in the valley unless the insurgents and their leaders enter into a 
meaningful dialogue with the Government and towards that effect 
five senior Hurriyat leaders were released on May 4, 2000, namely, 
Yasin Malik, Abdul Majid Dandoo, Abdul Ahad Waza, Ghulam 
Mohammed Sankara and Mohammed Ashraf Sehrai after being 
detained for more than six months under the Public Safety Act. The 
other senior Hurriyat leaders like Syed AH Shah Geelani, Abdul 
Ghani Bhat and Maulana Abbas Ansari, too were released the same 
month after over six months of detention under the Act.^ ^ Advani 
said, while commenting on the release of Hurriyat Conference 
leaders that "it was a goodwill gesture by the Government"." He 
also asserted the stand of Government on May 10, 2000 that it 
would soon initiate dialogue with Hurriyat Conference and other 
groups in Kashmir but asserted that any dialogue would be within 
the framework of the Indian Constitution.''* 
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VI: CEASE-FIRE 
In a major policy initiative to usher peace in Jammu and 
Kashmir, the Centre announced a unilateral cease-fire against 
militants on November 19, 2000. Prime Minister 'Attal Bihari 
Vajpayee' said, "'the decision to announce cessation of all attacks by 
Security Forces against the militants was taken to normalize the 
situation in the State so that peace talks could be held for all those 
who are willing to hold a dialogue".^^ Home Minister L.K.Advani 
also said that unilateral cease-fire in Kashmir is not just for militant 
groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir, but it is addressed 
primarily to Pakistan.^^ The move was widely welcomed and 
appreciated. The former Prime Ministers of India, V.P. Singh, 
Chandra Shekar, H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral in a joint 
statement declared that, " the cease-fire offer was a timely 
initiative and deserved to be welcomed by all those committed to 
peace and negotiated resolution of the Kashmir issue."^' In 
response to the unilateral cease-fire by India in Kashmir, Pakistan 
ordered its troops along the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and 
Kashmir to exercise " maximum restraint" and formally conveyed 
to India its willingness to enter into a "meaningful dialogue" to 
address the Kashmir conflict.^* This initiative helped to a great 
extent in bringing peace to the valley. The trend did not remain 
confined to the hinterland alone but a change in the atmosphere of 
borders was also reported." India's cease-fire initiative paid 
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dividends in the war haunted Saichan Glacier/^ The members of the 
All Party Hurriyat Conference also welcomed the move and 
reiterated their demand to settle the dispute once and for all/' The 
cease-fne was further extended by one more month till February 
26, 2001. However, some of the militant groups notably, the 
Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkatul Mujahiddin, were 
excluded from the truce in view of their pro-Pakistan stand and 
alleged involvement in the Red Fort attack and the threat to the 
Prime minister. There can be no two opinions about the sincerity of 
the Union Government about its intention to restore peace and 
normalcy in valley without bloodshed and gunfire. However, future 
alone can tell whether these endeavors would yield any positive 
results. The experience of cease-fire for past one month was not 
very satisfactory. The peace process is certainly hoodwinked by very 
various forces and factors. Foremost, among them is the opposition 
to the cease-fire by Farooq Abdullah. He also opposed its extension 
but later yielded to the decision of the Union Government, although 
reluctantly. It is a fact that the Union and state Governments are 
having diametrically opposite policies vis-a-vis the cease-fire. The 
state is going all-out to derail the peace process. The state police, 
it is alleged, has resorted to custodial killings during the cease fire 
period. Abdullah has his own reasons and worries, for any lasting 
peace in Kashmir would put him in political bewilderment. His 
political carrier and survival lies in maintaining the status quo, a 
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state of turmoil. So is the case with the militant groups, who 
believe more in Jihad than in conflict resolution through dialogue 
and negotiations. The Union Government finds in Abdullah, a good 
and dependable ally, for to stick to political power, he readily 
discarded the decades old ideology of the National Conference to 
join hands with the BJP to remain at the helm of Kashmir affairs, 
for which ideology or political party or principles are immaterial. It 
is this politiking that has done irrepairable damage to the cause of 
Kashmir and Kashmiris. The State, in this process, neither got 
financial relief nor autonomy. It is doubtful whether the Hurriyat 
Conference, which represents the majority of the militant groups in 
the valley can deliver the goods in the wake of opposition from 
other militant organizations like Lashar-e-Toiba and Harkatul 
Mujahiddin. However, if the Hurriyat is confident of providing a 
solution to the Kashmir tangle, there is no reason why it should not 
be sent to Pakistan for a dialogue with its counterparts. The Union 
Government should not dilly-dally over the issuing of passports to 
the delegates of the Conference. The one-month curfew did not 
provide much headway except that there was no gunfire on the LOC, 
the plight of civilians, however, remained unchanged. It also failed 
to move General Mushraff and company who still adhere to the 
rhetoric of Jihad instead of concrete gestures of peace. The only 
contribution of the cease-fire seems to be the emergence of the 
Hurriyat as the sole voice of the majority of the militant groups. 
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which has increased its bargaining power with the Union 
Government. What is surprising is that in the whole process, the 
National Conference does not figure anywhere. Abdullah and the 
National conference have lost all credibility and public confidence. 
A new leadership replacing the old guard seems to be an imperative. 
It is equally necessary that the Hurriyat Conference and other 
militant organizations, the Union Government and above all Pakistan 
must show their sincerity and commitment to a peaceful resolution 
of the problem. Unilateral cease-fire is meaningless if it is not 
reciprocated by other parties, especially Pakistan. 
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IMPACT OF MILITANCY ON 
DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES 
Militancy, whatever is its form or manifestation is bound 
to produce harmful effects disrupting normal life, retarding 
economic development and clouding internal security. The 
creditionals of the government also become suspect. Its worst 
impact would be on the economic process affecting production and 
welfare activities. A state, like Kashmir, where poverty, illitracy, 
unemployment reign supreme, cannot afford militant activities 
resulting in economic instability. Being a border state, with 
Pakistan always ready to fish in the trouble waters, it is all the more 
necessary to maintain peace and tranquility. But militancy over the 
years has completely paralysed its economy and has made the 
people to leave the State. Bridges, power projects and a host of 
other structures have been blasted off, halting thereby the smooth 
working of these ongoing programmes. It has stopped enterpreneurs 
from undertaking new ventures. The result is that the state has failed 
to keep pace with the fast changing economic scenario and 
compulsions of globalisation. Posterity will never forgive the 
vendalism let loose by the militants and the inaction/lack of 
appropriate action by the State and the Union. Crores of rupees 
which are spent on containing militancy could have very well been 
spent on eradication of poverty and unemployment, thereby bringing 
economic viability and political stability to the state. 
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Militancy has its worst impact on education which is a key 
sector in a developing state. In the State, hundreds of educational 
institutions got destroyed, the rest remain frequently closed and the 
remaining hardly do any meaningful work. In order to cut off the 
lines and land communication of the Indian troops and to hamper 
their easy movement, the militants indulged in destroying bridges 
and government buildings and schools where the troops were often 
stationed. Over 80% of the basic infrastructure i.e., buildings, 
schools, hospitals and bridges were destroyed during militancy.^ 
Atleast 157 major and 244 minor bridges and 828 schools were 
gutted down. Thus causing material damage worth crores of rupees. 
Just the torching down of schools caused a damage of 14.44 crore. 
Out of damaged bridges and school buildings only 130 and 489 have 
been reconstructed respectively.^ During the ongoing turmoils, 
property worth crores of rupees was gutted down inthe encounters 
between the militants and security forces e.g. Sopore locally known 
as "Chotta London" and Lai Chowk in Srinagar the state's most 
buzzling bazar and biggest commercial centre were reduced to ashes 
in such incidents. The details of the property loss in these two 
major incidents is as follows : 
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Details of Residential Houses burnt on Jan. 6, 93 at Sopore 
S.No 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1. Name and address of 
property owner 
Ghulam Malta 
S/o Ghulam Moliidin 
R/o Shallapora Sopore 
Mohammad Ashoor Malla 
R/o Shallpora 
Abdul Ahad Liloo 
R/o Muslimpora 
Hafiza 
D/o Mohammad Malla 
R/o Shalipora 
Ghulam Nabi Malik 
Abdul Majid Malik 
Manzoor Malik 
R/o Shalpora 
Mohammad Anwar Malik 
Sarandaz Malik 
Mohammad Dilawar Malik 
Riyaz Ahmad Malik 
S/o Mohammad Usman 
Description 
of Property 
3-storeyed house 
A Class 
2-storeyed 
C Class 
3-storeyed resi-
dential Building 
A Class 
2-storeyed building 
C Class 
2-storeyed house 
B Class 
3-storeyed house 
B Class 
1-storeyed 
(kitchen) 
A Class 
Abdul Gani Dar 
S/o Mohammad Ramzan Shallpora 
Ghulam Ahmad Malla 
(Jandgaroo) 
R/o Muslimpeer Sopore 
Mohammad Syed Antoo 
S/o Nazir Ahmad Antoo 
R/o Muslimpeer Sopore 
2-storeyed 
A Class 
3-storeyed 
A Class 
Estimated 
cost 
(in lacs) 
3 lac 
llac 
6 lac 
1.50 lac 
3 lac 
5 lac 
0.75 lac 
6 lac 
5.5 lac 
No. of 
persons 
rendered 
homeless 
one family 
one family 
one family 
one family 
3 families 
4 families 
one family 
one family 
one family 
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Chapter 4 
Details of Residential Property damaged/Burnt on 2.5.93 at 
Hathi Shah Sopore 
S.No. Name and address of 
property owner 
1. Mohd. Sgabab Ganai 
S/o Kh. Amin Ganai 
2A. Gh. Ahmed peer 
S/o Peer Mohd. Abdullah 
Description 
of Property 
3 storeyed 
building (Roof 
and one Storey 
damaged) 
5 storey building 
Estimated 
cost 
(in lacs) 
1.50 
9.00 
No.of 
persons 
rendered 
homeless 
13 
6 
B. Mohd. Ibrahim 
S/o Gh. Ahmed Peer 
6. 
Auqaf Building 
Ab. Aziz Khan 
Mala Begum D/o Sidiq 
Yattoo 
Gh. Mohd. Yattoo 
S/o Sadiq Yattoo 
Mohd. Subhan Ganai 
S/o Sadiq Ganai 
Gh. Mohd. Ganai 
S/o Nabir Ganai 
Haji Ramzan Ganai 
S/o Ismail Ganai 
A-Mala Begum 
W/o Ab. Ahad Dhobi 
3 Storeyed 
(House Hold) 
1 Storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
4 storeyed " 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
8.00 
5.00 
5.00 
6.00 
B. Ab. Salam Dhobi 
S/o Ab. Ahad 
10. Ab. Rehman 
11. Ab. Gaffar Dhobi 
S/o Habib Dhobi 
12. Mohd. Hayat Dhobi 
S/o Ismail Dhobi 
13. Mohd. Yusuf Bhat 
S/o Ab. Khaliq 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed 
(roof damaged) 
2 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3.00 
0.50 
3.00 
6.00 
18 
5 
5 
7 
5 
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B. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Gh. Mohd. Bhat 
S/o Ab. Khaliq 
Ab. Gaffar Gujree 
S/o Mohd. Shaban 
Ab. Rahman 
S/o Sabir Gujree 
Ab. Khaliq Gujree 
S/o Samad Gujree 
Bh-uddin Gujree 
S/o Sabir Gujree 
Mohd. Akbar Gujree 
S/o Gaffar Gujree 
Hafi Ab.Khaliq Bhat 
S/o Gh. Qadir Bhat 
Gh. Mohd. Mir 
S/o Mohd. Sultan 
21A.Gh. Mohd., Khan 
B. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
S/o Ismail Khan 
Mohd. Yusuf 
S/o Ismail Khan 
Mehrajuddin 
S/o Gh. Hassan zarger 
Mohd. Sultan Kanjwal 
S/o Mohd. Rajab 
Gh. Rasool Shoosha 
S/o Shaban 
Gh. Mohd. Shoosha 
S/o Shaban 
Farooq Ahmed Kanjwal 
S/o Abdul Ahad 
Mohd. Sidiq Shoosho 
S/o Gh. Mohd. 
Ab. Majeed Kanjwal 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
4 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
3 storeyed Building 
3 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
5.00 
2.50 
3.00 
2.50 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
1.50 
3 
5 
4 
5 
3 
3 
8 
6 
10 
3 
7 
10 
7 
4 
9 
6 
4 
29. Gh. Nabi Shoosha 
S/o Gh. Rasool 
30, Ab. Rashid Shoosha 
S/o Gh. Rasool 
3 storeyed " 1.50 (Household 6 
goods) 
2 storeyed " 1.50 
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31. Ab. Rashid Dhobi 
S/o Gh. Mohd. 
32A.Gh. Qadir Ganai 
S/o Mohd. Ramzan 
B. Gh. Hassan Ganai 
Mohd. Ramzan 
C. Gh.Nabi Ganai 
S/o Mohd. Ramzan 
D. Mohd. Ashraf Ganai 
S/o Gh. Qadir Ganai 
3 storeyed " 
4 storeyed " 
2.50 
7.50 
7 
3 
4 
3 
2 
33. Tariq Ahmed Dhobi 
S/o Gh. Mohd. 
34. Lai Din Dhobi 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed 
(Roof only) 
3.00 
0.50 
Details of Residential Property damaged/Burnt on 2.5.93 at 
Jamia Qadeerr Sopore 
S.No 
lA. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H, 
1. Name and address of 
property owner 
Gh. Mohiudin Bhat 
S/o Ab. Rahman 
Mohd. Shafi Bhat 
S/o Gh. Mohidin 
Mushtaq Ahmed 
S/o Gh. Mohidin 
Ab. Rashid Bhat 
S/o Wali Mohd. 
Mohd. Amin 
S/o Wali Mohd. 
Amjad Ali 
S/o Wali Mohd. 
Mohd. Maqbool 
S/o Ab. Rahman 
Ab. Hamid 
S/o Wali Mohd. 
Description 
of Property 
4 storeyed 
Building 
Estimated 
cost 
(in lacs) 
7.00 
No. of 
persons 
rendered 
homeless 
5 
5 
4 
6 
5 
3 
6 
2 
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2A. 
B. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Mehrajuddin Bhat 
S/o Karim 
Gh. Hassan 
Gh. Qadir Bhat 
S/o Ab. Ahad 
Ab. Majeed Bhat 
S/o Gh. Ahmed 
Gh. Jeelani Bhat 
S/o Ab. Ahad 
Gh. Nabi Bhat 
S/o Khaliq Bhat 
Gh. Ahmed Bhat 
S/o Khaliq Ghat 
Shamina Bhat 
D/o Khazir Bhat 
Mohd. Subhan Bhat 
Mohd. Maqbool Bhat 
S/o Haji Ahmed 
Gh. Hassan Rangrez 
S/o Ab. Ahad 
Mohd. Amin Rangrez 
S/o Gh. Hassan 
Habibullah Rangrez 
S/o Mohd. Sultan 
Gh. Hassan Rangrez 
S/o Ab. Gaffar 
Gh. Uddin Rangrez 
S/o Sabit Bhat 
2 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
4 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
1 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
2 storeyed " 
3 storeyed " 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
5 
4 
10 
6 
7 
8 
9 
4 
1 
1 
5 
3 
6 
5 
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The first and foremost effect of militancy was witnessed 
in the rank and file of administraiton in the valley. By the end of 
1988, the situation in the valley had become very grim. The trend of 
the militant activities, as also their plans and strategy, however, 
suggest that their effort was to totally disrupt the political process 
and to paralyse the state administraiton in order to achieve their 
objective of freedom from India. The militants were able to draw 
the people to the streets to give vent to their anguish against the 
Indian administration. Unlike Punjab, the masses in the valley took 
recourse to protests leading to a spiral of violence between the 
police and the people. They carried out systematic anti-Indian 
campaign by hurling the Pakistani flag and burning of the "tricolour" 
to demoralise the adminsitration. They did not hesitate to resort to 
violence on the slightest provocation, be it Zia's death in air crash, 
or over Salman Rushdie "Stanic verses". The State Government 
either did not act or when it responded, it resorted to brutal 
repression leading to further violence. The political process in the 
state had come to a standstill and everything that is Indian became 
anathema to a Kashmiri Muslim of the valley. The mass mobilisation 
of the population against the State Government and the marked 
deterioration of law and order situation had completely demoralised 
the state apparatus.^ It was believed that with the instalment of a 
democratic government, things will improve and the hatred against 
the security forces, which often led to violence will gradually end. 
But that was not to be and the worst incidents of violence, took 
place during Farooq's regime."• Commenting on this, India Today, 
rightly observes that "more than 21 months since the National 
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Conference - Congress I alliance came to piower in the state, 
Kashmir seems ready to burst at the seams. Inefficiency, corruption, 
religious fundamentalism and escalating violence stalk the valley as 
Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah appears increasingly helpless and 
isolated. For the people of Kashmir, it has been a long hot summer 
of discontent and anguish, bloodshed and betrayal, pledges and 
apostasy and things do not promise to get better even as the Chinars 
and the paddy begin to ripen in autumn breezes. The state is 
festering like a sensitive gumboil. Touch any part of it and there is a 
painful violent eruption. The "antisentimental" bells being sounded 
by the present leadership are, however, in themselves a bell weather 
of something rotten in the state. Demonstrations in Srinagar and 
Baramullah have had the better edge of anti-Indianism. The Jamat-e-
Islami in South Kashmir and radical groups like the People's League 
continue to be of nuisance value, in being able to attract young 
cadre-minded recruits who still question the state's accession to 
India and demand a return to Nizam-e-Mustafa. Today administrative 
life remains paralysed by bureaucratic infighting and petty jobbery. 
The roads including the "show-piece" stretch from the international 
airport near Srinagar to the city proper are an abomination. The 
government is also being elitest and antipoor, no town in Kashmir 
has a proper sewage system".^ In view of the deteriorating situation, 
Governor's rule was imposed on the state on January 19, 1990 and 
Jagmohan took over the reins of the State. Major political leaders 
and activists of the various political parties suspected of 
collaborating with the agitated youth were arrested but this too 
could not bring the situation under control. 
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Saxena took over from Jogmohan in July 1990 declaring 
valley and 20 kilometers belt of Rajouri and Poonch area as 
disturbed on July 15, 1990, which provided him a free hand to curb 
militancy. The Disturbed Area Act, vested enormous powers in the 
armed forces.^ All this was done with the objective to curb the 
militancy with a strong hand but it proved counterproductive. This, 
not only, alienated the common people but also the government 
employees, thereby affecting administrative efficiency. The Muslim 
employees of the Government formed a Co-ordination Committee 
to voice the grievances of the people. The government responded by 
dismissing the members of the Co-ordination Committee, with the 
result, the working in all government establishments, hospitals, 
banks, corporations, local bodies came to a standstill and the 
employees went on an indefinite strike from 15th September 1990, 
protesting against governments dictatorial dismissal order of Co-
ordination Committee members. As there appears no signs of 
yielding by Saxena government, life became miserable for already 
suffering people of the valley. Government controlled ration depots, 
co-operative shops remained closed. Non-functioning of Banks 
paralysed the commercial activities. Hospitals were closed and the 
hardships continued to mount day by day. At this critical juncture, 
voluntary groups of youth came to the rescue of the people and 
arranged purchase and transportation of essentials from various 
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parts of the state and even from Punjab. At last good sense prevailed 
upon the government and all the dismissed leaders of the Co-
ordination Committee were reinstated, employees were granted full 
salary of the striking period of seventy three days7 The government, 
once again proved that it can sccumb only to large scale pressure 
accompanied by violence and when people silently lodge their 
protest, it turns a deaf ear. The violence saw the exit of Governor 
Saxena who was replaced by Krishna Rao. Barely a month after his 
appointment as Governor, Krishna Rao had to confront with the 
police revolt in Srinagar, over the death of a constable, Reyaz 
Ahmad, in Army custody on April 21. The constable had been 
arrested at the Hazratbal shrine on suspicion of having link with the 
insurgents-Gn April 22, -the news of his death spread throughout 
Srinagar and prompted the police to go on strike. The Army was 
rushed to restore normalcy and to persude the police to end their 
strike. Surprisingly, the police called off the strike without even a 
single shot being fired. A commission to investigate the death of 
the constable was set up and the matter was resolved peacefully for 
the time being.^ The resentment among the people however, did not 
die. The militant exercises - the bomb blasts, arson, destruction of 
property (Public and private) caused heavy losses to the public 
exchequer and made lives miserable. The state government admitted 
that security related expenditure is one of the major cause of JK's 
financial woves.^ To curb militancy, government had to deploy 
143 
Chapter 4 
security forces i.e. B.S.F., CRPF, the ITBP and RR (special unit of 
the Indian Army trained in counter insurgency activities). A rough 
assessment of the number of the Indian security personnel deployed 
in the Kashmir valley, to combat insurgency, place the total near 
four hundred thousand.'° The State Government also deployed 
18,000 SPO's to combat militancy who are paid 32.5 crore of 
rupees as their yearly salary. And in case of death they are paid an 
ex-gratia relief of one lakh by the government. ^ ^ The net result has 
been heavy expenditure on the part of the government resulting on 
the one hand loss of revenue and on the other hand due to closure 
of markets, interruption of commercial activities especially the 
business of tourism. The deployment of forces in Kashmir is India's 
largest and most significant counter-insurgency operations todate. 
The operation was a drain on the Indian exchequer. Exact estimates 
are not available but nevertheless, a rough esitmate of 60% of the 
annual administrative expenses of the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
are diverted to security related activities.'^ The security related 
expenditure has consistently shown an upword trend from Rs. 2.21 
crore in 1989-90 to Rs. 138.06 crore in 1990-91, Rs. 151.97 crore 
in 1991-92 Rs. 150.09 crore in 1992-93, Rs. 172.67 crore in 1993-
94, Rs. 201.47 crore in 1994-95, Rs. 233.75 crore in 1995-96, Rs. 
254.75 crore in 1996-97, Rs. 353.47 crore in 1997-98, Rs. 513.76 
crore in 1998-99, Rs. 617.13 crore in 1999-2000.'^ In order to 
make improvement in the infrastructure, such as the means of 
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communication and weaponery and to increase the number of 
personnel of the Jammu and Kashmir^with the objective to combat 
militancy Rs. 772 crores were spent till November 2000.''' 
During the summer of 1990, the Kashmiris migrated, on a 
large scale to the plains of Northern India. Among them, apart from 
the Kashmiri Pandits, there was a fair number of Kashmiri Muslims 
also. The number of migrants is estimated at more than 3,00,000 
who concentrated mainly around Jammu and Delhi. There are fairly 
good number of Government employees also and they were paid 
their salaries without work, their rehabilitation was also taken care 
of simultaneously backdoor appointments were made against the 
vacancies created by these migrants. (It was termed as migrant 
vacancies). Thus government had to pay double salaries for the same 
post. The land and property owned by the migrant population had to 
be exempted from taxes resulting in collosol loss to the state. 
Similarly the collection of taxes and fees were also severely 
hampered by the militants. For example Lashkar-e-Toiba, one of the 
militant outfits threatened the Government nbt to demand power 
tarrif from the people and warned of strict action in case of its 
defiance. It also directed the newspapers not to publish 
advertisements asking people to pay the tarrif.'^ As a result, the 
Power Development Department had to incur a loss of 575 crore. 
The State spends Rs. 675 crore on purchase of power but only 100 
crores were realised. Transmission losses are reported as 60%.'^ 
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Similarly at least fifteen companies in which the state government 
had invested Rs. 134 crore as on March 1999, were running in 
losses and their accumulated losses aggregated to Rs. 88 crore upto 
March 31, 1999 "^^  
Tourism, which forms the backbone of the Kashmir 
economy, too was badly affected by militancy. Kashmir which was 
well known for being a tourist spot soon turned into a haunted place 
keeping the tourists away. This resulted in the decline of foreign 
exchange earnings and badly affected the economy of the state. 
According to the American Chamber of Commerce, broadly there 
are three ways of increasing the wealth and business activity of a 
country viz. the development of the agricultural front, progress in 
the industrial sphere and development in the tourism field. Tourism 
development is probably the quickest, least difficult method of the 
three.'^ As an economic activity the dimensions of tourism are 
varied. Tourism constitutes a demand for services and consumer 
goods which stimulates production. This causes an increase in 
income levels leading to an automatic increase in total national 
consumption. The construciton of places for accomodation, 
urbanisation for tourist purposes, infrastructure development, 
development of recreational facilities etc. encourage investments. 
It helps in regeneration of finance sector (banking, insurgence etc.) 
and professional services. The revenues from the tourists not only 
supports the tourist industry but also supports many other industries 
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which supply the necessary parapernalia to sustain the tourist 
industry. Tourism also acts as a source of infrastructural 
improvement and development of new infrastructure to attract more 
and more people which in turn also benefits the local inhabitants 
with overall improvement in supply of water, electricity, better 
roads and modes of transport. Besides, the tourism industry also 
generates employment avenues and provides a wide range of jobs 
like managers of hotels, accountants, housekeepers, waiters, cooks, 
entertainers and also semiskilled workers such as porters, chamber 
maids, kitchen staff, gardeners. Tourism also gives a big boost to 
the construction activity. Construction of hotels, roads, airports and 
allied activities, thus, improving the living conditions of the people. 
The fear let loose by the militants and the security forces and the 
inability of the law and order machinery to restore normalcy, has 
severely affected the tourist industry. The militants in the name of 
religion have often resorted to destruction of hotels, picture 
houses, video parlours etc, causing a loss of revenue to the state 
and discouraging people from visiting the valley.'^ The situation in 
the valley affected tourism not only in Kashmir but also in the 
Jammu region. It resulted in a decline in trade in Jammu. The 
number of pilgrims to Vishnoo Devi decreased. Many traders had 
got their money blocked. Operators of commercial vehicles and 
hotels complained about the absence of visitors.^° The region rich 
in natural resources and handicrafts and with its incredible beauty 
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used to draw tourists from all over the world but with the advent of 
militancy, the tourist influx in the valley is almost zero, the 
Victorian house boats in Dal Lake and the hotels remain empty. 
Their owners have either joined the militant ranks or taken up some 
odd jobs. These days; quite often, dead bodies beyond recognition 
or remains of human debris are frequently fished out of lakes and 
rivers. The magnificient Mughal Gardens, a great tourist attraction 
have been over run by weeds. Centuries old monuments are 
crumbling due to lack of maintenance.'^' In the process Kashmir was 
deprived of all the benefits which it used to enjoy because of its 
flourishing tourism industry. When the wave of turbulence took the 
valley by surprise, tourism process drifted into operational coma. 
The abysmal tourist arrivals prominently depict the state of tourist 
traffic during the period are prominent over the tourist calender of 
the state. 
Year-wise Growth of Tourist Traffic to J «& K (1947-1996) 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
Domestic 
11,293 
-
3,321 
5,885 
9,333 
11,630 
19,319 
32,865 
International 
3,290 
-
425 
898 
1,246 
1,470 
2,060 
1,760 
Total 
14,568 
-
3,746 
6,783 
10,579 
13,100 
21,381 
34,645 
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1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
48,195 
57,341 
37,172 
54,017 
60,354 
63,373 
79,137 
80,334 
72,137 
48,538 
37,231 
1,12,127 
1,35,653 
1,29,750 
93,552 
1,05,420 
79,612 
1,08,445 
1,75,829 
1,48,320 
1,62,576 
2,68,412 
3,87,817 
4,43,342 
4,98,067 
5,48,491 
5,98,555 
2,820 
7,012 
6,346 
6,540 
10,866 
11,187 
13,214 
12,661 
11,552 
8,182 
8,020 
7,149 
10,428 
10,946 
13,007 
15,737 
15,240 
17,841 
20,017 
19,299 
22,214 
38,078 
54,223 
59,323 
55,680 
46,026 
48,745 
51,025 
64,353 
43,018 
60,557 
71,220 
74,560 
92,455 
93,015 
83,687 
56,720 
45,541 
1,19,276 
1,46,081 
1,40,696 
1,00,959 
1,21,153 
94,852 
1,25,486 
1,95,846 
1,67,619 
1,84,790 
3,24,490 
4,42,040 
5,02,665 
5,53,747 
5,94,517 
6.42.300 
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1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
5,60,987 
3,98,428 
1,92,684 
4,65,599 
5,36,598 
6,64,081 
6,62,097 
4,90,215 
6,095 
1,400 
1,175 
-
500 
322 
375 
42,851 
41,101 
36,458 
38,015 
53,118 
57,573 
59,938 
67,762 
4,627 
4,887 
9,149 
8,026 
9,314 
8,198 
9,592 
6,03,838 
4,39,529 
2,29,142 
5,03,614 
5,89,716 
7,21,654 
7,22,035 
5,57,977 
10,722 
6,287 
10,324 
8,026 
9,814 
8,520 
9,967 
Source : Statistical Section JKTDC (Srinagar). 
Starting with 1990-91 total tourist arrivals gasped at 
10722 inclouding 4627 foreigners which was -98.08% less than the 
previous year (1989-90) figures. In the year 1991-92, total tourist 
arrivals dwindled further to 6287 which included 4887 foreigners 
and 1400 domestic tourists with domestic arrivals 77.03% less than 
the previous year (1990-91). In the year 1992-93, total tourist 
arrival effected a small increase reaching 10324 arrivals with 9149 
foreigners. Domestic tourism continued to freeze down reaching 
1175 arrivals and registered a 83.93% fall as compared to the 
previous year (1991-92) figures. The year 1993-94 was the year of 
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domestic tourism. Domestic tourism finally succumbed to the 
cascading effect of insurgency and vanished from the scene. Foreign 
arrivals however made the tourism process going and registered 
8026 arrivals. 1994 had a total of 9814 arrivals which included 500 
domestic and 9314 foreigners. The total tourist arrivals during the 
Eighth Five Year Plan period recorded 60853 arrivals which 
included 52831 foreigners and 8022 home tourists. Total arrivals 
during the Eighth Five Year Plan recorded a 98% decrease as 
compared to the total arrivals during the Vll Plan period. The 
downfall in domestic tourist arrivals during the plan was 99.69% 
from the VII Plan period figures while foreign arrivals showed a 
down fall of 87.6% from the VII Five Year Plan period arrivals 
(Foreign).^^ The total income from non-pilgrim tourists including 
foreigners was Rs. 100.63 crores and when the turbulence broke out 
in the valley in late 1989, the figure dashed almost to the ground, 
trembled at Rs. 3.18 crores in 1990 thereby registering a downfall 
of 96.84% as compared to that in the year 1980. 
The figure again slid down to the minimum 2.62 crores in 
1991. During the period 1990-1995, the total income accord from 
non pilgrim tourists amounted to Rs. 26.38 crores while the total 
income realised from non pilgrini tourists during 1985-89 
measured Rs. 463.38 crores. This indicates a downfall of 94.17% 
from what was actualised during 1985-89, during the period of 
normalcy. 
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Income Generated from Non-Pilgrim Tourists in J & K 
during the period 1995-96 
Year Domestic 
Arrivals Income 
International Total Percentage 
Arrivals Income Income (Inter-
national) 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
6095 
1400 
1175 
0.0 
500 
322 
00.89 
00.20 
00.19 
0.0 
00.09 
00.06 
4627 
4887 
9149 
8026 
9314 
8198 
02.29 
02.42 
05.05 
04.66 
05.66 
05.21 
03.18 
02.62 
05.24 
04.66 
05.75 
05.27 
72 
92 
96 
100 
98 
98 
Source : Directorate of Tourism, J & K Govt. 
Although the pilgrim traffic to Vaishnoo Devi remained 
practically unaffected by the ongoing turbulence in the valley but 
the income from Amarnath Yatra however took a reverse path with 
the erruption of insurgency the total income from Amarnath Yatra 
was Rs. 14.13 crore by the end of 1989 which slashed to 0.75 
crores in 1990, showing a downfall of 94.7% from the income 
actualised in 1989. When insurgency struck the valley in early 
1990, the total earnings from tourism slashed to 100.01 crores 
which showed a downfall of 53.9% figures. The total loss in 1991 
from non pilgrim tourism was 106.9 crores which subsequently 
reached to an estimated loss of 143.31 crores. Thus during the 
period spanning 1990-1995, a total accumulated loss of Rs. 754.78 
152 
Chapter 4 
crores was incurred due to serious downfall in the non-pilgrim 
tourism.^-' 
Tourism Income (Projected and Actual) and Income Lost 
During 1990-95 (Non-Pilgrim Tourism) 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Income Generated from 
Non-pilgrims (in 
Projected 
110.09 
112.55 
126.88 
135.65 
143.75 
152.70 
crores) 
Actual 
3.18 
2.62 
5.24 
4.66 
5.75 
5.46 
Total Income 
Lost 
(-)106.90 
(-)109.90 
(-)121.64 
(-)130.09 
(-)138.00 
(-)147.31 
Source : Directorate of Tourism, J & K Govt. 
Similarly during the turmoil period (1990-95), the state 
lost 60240 employments during the first year of turmoil which 
subsequently reached to an estimated loss of 63362 employments 
during the period of turmoil under study (1990-95) accumulated to 
3,64,657. When related to the total percentage of employment lost 
was 92.29% in 1990 which slipped to a loss of 84.70% of the total 
projected employment in 1995.^ "^  
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Total Employment Generated (Projected &. Actual) and Total 
Empoyment Lost during 1990-95 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Total Employment 
Generated 
Project Actual 
65270 
67178 
69086 
70994 
72902 
74810 
5030 
5321 
1116 
10240 
12439 
11448 , 
Total Employment 
Lost 
Estimated Percentage 
(-)60240 
(-) 61857 
(-) 57981 
(-) 60754 
(-) 60463 
(-) 63362 
(-) 92.29 
(-) 92.08 
(-) 83.92 
(-) 85.58 
(-) 82.94 
(-) 84.70 
Source : Research papers of Dr. Nazir Mirza, Department of 
Commerce, Islamia College, Srinagar. 
Forestry also formed a major source of income for the 
state. The Kashmir forests used to be rich in medicinal plants and 
good quality of timber such as Deader and Kairoo but with the 
dawn of militancy, the forests in Kashmir were highly damaged. The 
forest officials, taking advantage of the situation joined hands with 
the smugglers in robbing the wealth of the forests. The Kashmir 
Government had sizeable amount of revenue from export of timber 
and other forest products. Because of heavy shelling from across 
the Line of Control, forests often caught fire causing damage of 
crores of rupees, and affected adversely the wildlife in the state. In 
the Neelam Valley alone, due to forest fire about 105,000 acres of 
forests were destroyed. The forest officials related it with the 
Chapter 4 
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continued dry spell and the Governments of both the countries 
blamed each other for shelling on the Line of Control (LOC). The 
ill-equipped fire fighting machinery and lack of sufficient funds 
made the confusion worst confounded in putting out the fire 
especially in high altitude areas ranging from 4,000 to 12,000 feet 
above sea level. Particularly roaring fire in the woods close to the 
LOC could not be put out because these areas were infested with 
land mines.^^ During all these years of turmoil, the forest output 
started showing a downward trend. After 1987, the revenue realized 
from forests also showed the same trend. 
Year 
1980-81 
1085-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
Revenue realised 
(Rs . in Lakhs) 
3423.84 
4646.50 
3997.78 
4571.13 
4981.78 
2442.48 
2304.42 
3252.81 
4314.75 
*789.66 
1141.83 
*Excluding revenue realized. 
Source : 1. State budget 
2. D.F.O. Sts. 
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3. Government of Jammu & Kashmir Digest of 
Statistics, 1998-99 
Directorate of Economics & Statistics Planning and 
Development Department Table No. 6.04, page 91. 
The agricultural production also suffered a set back. Due 
to unsafe conditions, a large number of people migrated to other 
parts of country and their land remained unattended and 
uncultivated, affecting the agricultural output. Till 1986-87, the 
state was more or less self-sufficient as far as food grains are 
concerned but after 1987, the State witnessed shortage of 
foodgrains and had to seek the assistance from other states which 
incurred additional burden on the state's exchequer. 
Imports of foodgrains (lakh tonnes) 
Year Import of foodgrains 
1981-82 1.42 
1984-85 2.14 
1985-86 1.48 
1986-87 1.98 
1987-88 3.54 
1988-89 3.85 
1989-90 3.44 
1990-91 2.79 
1991-92 3.75 
1992-93 3.33 
1993-94 2.87 
1994-95 2.66 
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1995-96 3.72 
1996-97 4.87 
1997-98 5.13 
1998-99 4,60 
Source : Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Digest of 
Statistics 1998-99. 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics Planning & 
Development Department, Table No. 11, 02, Page 136. 
Kashmir known for its excellent quality and variety of 
apples W as once a flourishing industry in Sopore and surrounding 
areas. Such was the demand for Kashmiri apples that vast area of 
rice and wheat producing lands were transformed into apple 
orchards to meet the growing demand. In a few years, the apple 
towns in Kashmir became economically very prosperous. However 
with the inception of militancy the fruit industry in the state faced a 
great jolt. The owners of orchards in Sopore, 'the apple basket of 
Asia' couldnot find any takers of their produce. Prior to the present 
termoil they used to get advances against the produce which used to 
go upto Rs. 8 crore against the estimated annual sale of about Rs. 
16 crore. Now, the advances are replaced by marginal subsidies.^^ 
The negligence on the part of the government owing to its 
involvement in the restoration of normalcy the fruit industry 
received a setback. During the periods, the facilities of cold 
storages was also not available, which spoiled the fruits resulting in 
heavy losses. Adding insult to injury, Kashmiri fruit growers were 
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levied taxes for transporting their fruit to Delhi whereas the 
growers in Himachal Pradesh were exempted from such taxes. 
Similarly during the period of turmoil Kashmiri fruit growers had 
to buy the pesticides in black market because of privatisation, while 
growers in Himachal Pradesh got these pesticides easily and on 
subsidized rates. This made it very difficult for the Kashmiri fruit 
growers even to recover their basic production and packing charges. 
Eventually due to lack of resources and Government input, Kashmir 
fruit industry became crippled by pests and diseases. As a result the 
flourishing fruit industry was taken over by the Himachal fruit 
industry.^^ The attacks on banks in the past brought to a stand still, 
of all the commercial activity. Most of the banks except J & K Bank 
have ceased to function, which made the task of advancing loans all 
the more difficult.^^ 
All this resulted in the financial crunch in the state and the 
state exchequer was almost bankrupt in 1998. The government was 
unable to pay off the pending bills worth six crore rupees. To tide 
over the crisis, the Government had to borrow Rs. 950 crore on 
interest from the Jammu and Kashmir Bank. According to 
Government sources, the major cause of the financial crisis is 
security related expenditure. The State had to meet out the security 
related expenditure on its own with least assistance from the Union 
Government which amounted to 16000 crore rupees in 1998.^ ^ The 
financial crisis in the state had assumed alarming proportions during 
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1999-2000 and even payment of salaries to its employees became 
difficult. The crisis left its impact on each and every sector of 
activity. Even the prestigious Sher-e-Kashmir University of 
Agricultural Sciences and Technology (SKUAST) is on the verge of 
closure for want of funds. The pathetic state of affairs could be 
guaged by the fact that the university had been without electricity 
and water for about two months, as it has no money to foot the bills. 
The scientists, teachers and other staff had to work without salaries 
for months and all academic activities came to a standstill.^° The 
only activity in the state has been the ding-dong battle between the 
security forces and the militants, creating a dismal mosaic of 
national life and paralysing all development work. 
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Education Sector 
College for Professional Education 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1994-95 
1993-94 
12 
12 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Year No. of Institutions 
Male Female Total 
1 13 
1 13 
2 15 
2 15 
2 15 
2 15 
2 15 
2 15 
2 15 
College for Special Education 
Year No. of Institutions 
Male Female Total 
2 8 
2 8 
2 8 
2 8 
2 8 
1 6 
1 6 
1 6 
1 8 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1994-95 
1993-94 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
7 
Source : Education Department, J & K 
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CONCLUSION 
A modest attempt has been made in the thesis, "Rise of 
Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and its impact on developmental 
processes", to examine the Kashmir crisis in its historical and 
contemporary perspective and its impact on the developmental 
processes in the State. Militancy is not a new phenomenon nor it is 
confined to Kashmir alone. It has assumed transnational 
dimensions. It is also true that it has been in existence since the 
dawn of civilization as a recurring theme in the history of mankind 
in different forms and manifestations. The difference between the 
contemporary militancy and the militancy in the past lies in their 
modus operandi. The scientific and technological innovations have 
made contemporary militancy more refined, sophisticated and 
easier. It is often used as political weapon and a tool of ideology. 
Very often it is resorted to under the garb of a liberation movement. 
Whatever be its focus, it is bound to disturb peace and tranquility 
and Jeopardise rights and freedoms of people. It becomes all the 
more dangerous when a particular race or religious community 
becomes its target. In a country like India where religious 
sentiments reign supreme and where people can be mobilised and 
exploited in the name of religion, such tactics can certainly pose a 
threat to the national unity and to the very existence of the nation. 
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The word terrorism has been presented differently by 
different people. The words terrorist, militant and fascist are often 
used interchangeably, which has made the confusion worse, 
confounded. The problem with the term is that each individual 
looks from his own point of view. Often one man's terrorist is 
another man's freedom fighter. Its precise content lacks a cut and 
dried definition. But whatever be its meaning and implication, its 
main purpose is to instil terror or fear among people, to disturb the 
status quo. It is often used as a political weapon to weaken the 
opponents and to produce the desired results. So seen in this 
perspective, terrorism bears a mode of action, violent and 
unconstitutional. However, in the contemporary scenario most of 
the cases of terrorist acts that come before the Security Council 
today do not aim at creating merely a state of terror but are 
intended to induce government to act in a particular way, for 
example, release of prisoners. It is, thus, used as an instrument to 
get the grievances redressed. The terrorists glorify terrorism as 
means to achieve political objectives. Apologists for terrorism often 
attempt to counter objections by comparing their own acts of 
violence with those of their opponents. By making such a 
comparison, they donot see anything wrong in their actions. 
Militancy, though resembles terrorism in many ways is a degree 
different from it. It stems from exploitation and repression either 
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by a powerful section of the society or by the state machinery and 
it is precisely for this reason that it enjoys the clout of public 
sympathy at least in some quarters. And unlike terrorism, militancy 
has a sufficient degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, 
opposition and the world community. If seen from the tactical point 
of view, there seems to be no difference because both nourish on 
kidnappings, hijackings, assassinations, bomb explosions -and 
suicide attacks, for the realisation of their objectives. An attempt 
has been made to discuss these things in the first chapter. 
The second chapter tries to trace out roots of the present 
crisis and its contemporary trends. A brief history of Kashmir 
during the Dogra period, whose foundation was laid down by Gulab 
Singh, a feudatory of Sikhs, who bought it for a cash payment of 75 
lakhs of rupees by the British, is given. Right from the Dogra Rule, 
the Muslim subjects, who formed the bulk of the population, bore 
the heaviest brunt of the Dogra autocracy which was highly 
exploitative. The economic miseries of the masses increased due to 
jagirdari system, exploitative revenue system and above all a 
corrupt administration. The first fifty years of the Dogra rule 
characterised by repression was responsible for disseminating the 
seeds of resentment in the minds of its subjects against its very 
existence. Politically suppressed and economically exploited, the 
Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir also suffered educational 
169 
Chapter 5 
backwardness. The anti-Muslim attitude of the Dogra Raj alienated 
the community from the so-called mainstream. The pleas and 
petitions of the Muslim community for their betterment went 
unheeded. Disputes over religious places became a common thing 
during this period in which mostly the rulers supported the Hindu 
community. With the transfer of power and partition of the sub-
continent, new problems cropped up. All the princely states were 
supposed either to join India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh neither joined India nor 
Pakistan. Kashmir being the Muslim populated state and keeping in 
view its strategic importance for the state of Pakistan, it sent armed 
infilitrators with a view to grab it. The Maharaja feeling helpless to 
deal with the situation made requests to India to help him in dealing 
with the situation. Nehru taking advantage of the situation forced 
him to sign the Instrument of Accession. Even the Viceroy, Lord 
Mountbatten, while signing the Instrument of Accession added a 
provision that the wishes of the people should be ascertained after 
normalcy is restored in the valley. Meanwhile India lodged a 
complaint in the UN which also recommended for a plebiscite in 
Kashmir but nothing concrete emerged and tension between the two 
countries further escalated. The wars thereafter, created further 
bitterness and Kashmir became an irritant for all times to come 
between India and Pakistan. Some serious efforts such as Tashkent 
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Agreement and Shimla Agreement were made by both the countries 
to sort out the Kashmir tangle and to maintain peaceful and 
harmonious relations. The accession was followed by Delhi 
Agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru whereby autonomy 
was guaranteed to the state by providing that, the Indian parliament 
could not frame laws without the consent of the State Assembly 
except in the areas of defence, external affairs and communication. 
Ironically both the instrument of Accession and Delhi Agreement 
were fragrantly violated and laws were passed by the Union 
infringing the autonomy of the State. Lop sided politics and politics 
of convenience and manipulation on the part of New Delhi towards 
Kashmir and repeated rigging of elections coupled with 
unprincipled compromises created a dismal mosaic of national and 
secular life in the state. As a result, the seeds of militancy were 
sown in the state but these seeds remained dormant until the state 
Assembly Elections of 1987, which were allegedly rigged on a 
massive scale providing favourable climate for the seeds of 
militancy to sprout. The youth which had actively participated in 
these elections as the activists of Muslim United Front and were 
looking at it as the final democratic resort to get their grievances 
redressed, got highly alienated. Finding no other alternative but to 
wage an armed struggle against the authority whom they thought 
had no legitimacy to rule over them, they crossed over the border 
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to get training in the use of arms and ammunition. Pakistan taking 
advantage of the situation added a new dimension to the present 
crisis by providing arms and ammunition to these disgruntled 
elements. Kashmir, which was a heaven on earth, was soon 
converted into a living hell with the sword of fear and terror 
hanging over the heads of one and all. Bomb blasts, kidnappings, 
assassinations, cross firing incidents, encounters, torture, 
molestation etc. etc. are writ large on the state. The impact of 
militancy was so strong that even a school-going lad can explain 
the make and range of deadly weapons like A.K. 47 and AK-56. 
Militancy in the contemporary era is no longer confined to 
national boundaries but has transcended the national borders and 
has assumed international dimensions. It is therefore imperative to 
tackle the problem both at national and international level. The 
third chapter is an attempt to highlight the various efforts made by 
the international community to deal with this problem at the global 
level and measures taken by the government to combat militancy in 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The efforts of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations in this direction have been 
discussed. It is a good omen that substantial progress has been 
made in the field of international co-operation in western Europe. 
The European Union (EU) has set a model for multilateral co-
operation. It provides a mechanism for developing an informal 
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collaboration and exchange of information between national police 
and intelligence officials. The G-7 summit held a three day 
ministerial meeting on Counter Terrorism in Paris in July 1966 and 
it was agreed that there should be co-ordination in intelligence 
work, treaties be signed facilitating the extradition of suspect 
terrorists, and establishment of a directory of counter-terrorism 
skills. At the meeting of G-7 States in June 1995, political leaders 
called for a special Counter Terrorism Conference of Ministers to 
prevent use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by 
terrorists. The chapter also analyses the measures taken to tackle 
militancy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Being a border state, 
a check on infilitration and smuggling especially of weapons, for 
which intensified vigil, is perhaps one remedy to restore normalcy. 
Deployment of security forces and intelligence network in the state 
is a desideratum in the wake of increasing number of militancy 
related incidents in the valley. But these short term measures can 
only cure the symptoms and not the disease. The problem needs to 
be tackled at political, economic and diplomatic fronts too apart 
from the military one. 
Militancy, whatever be its form or manifestation is bound 
to produce harmful effects. Hence the need was felt in this study to 
find out its impact on the developmental process in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. The fourth chapter of the thesis is an attempt 
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in that direction. With militancy hovering over the valley since 
1989, the Government had to deploy the security forces on a 
massive scale causing huge expenditure which could have been 
spent on eradication of poverty and unemployment. The blasts and 
encounters led to heavy losses of lives and property and generated 
a sense of insecurity all over the valley. The frequent bandhs, 
imposition of curfew paralysed the economic and commercial 
activities in the state. Tourism which formed the main source of 
income for the State was severely affected and the State was 
deprived of all the benefits which it enjoyed from the flourishing 
tourism industry. Apple industry also went into oblivion because of 
the lack of governmental initiative and diversion of attention. 
Forestry which also formed another good source of revenue for the 
state also suffered a lot. The public corporations such as State Road 
Transport Corporation, Food and Supplies Corporation in which 
government had a major share were also affected resulting in heavy 
losses. The net result was a fmaincial crisis in the state. The 
frequent disruption of law and order punctuated by violent incidents 
had a demoralising impact on the administration. All developmental 
activities came to a stand-still. The severity of the problem was 
manifest in the non-payment of salaries by the Govenunent to its 
employees for months. The State was reduced to almost bankruptcy. 
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The rot lies at the root. The policy of injustice and 
discrimination pursued over decades and lack of timely action to 
redress the grievances of the people, made them suspect the 
bonafides of the State machinery., Suppression of rights and 
exploitation of people over years is bound to cause repercussions, 
which took the form of militancy. Adhocism, political cliches and 
empty promises have done irrepairable damage to the State. What 
is therefore, required is a sober approach, free from political 
overtones, to the problems. The problems and grievances of the 
people have to be identified. The lapses on the part of the 
Government in addressing to these problems ought to be examined 
in the right perspective . The tendency to dub the whole area and 
the entire community as terrorist and ant-inational is a superficial 
way of looking at things ignoring the ground realities. Guns and 
bullets are counter productive and harmful in the long run as it has 
been proved beyond doubt in Kashmir. Mobilisation of public 
opinion in favour of Governments policies, through persuasion 
rather than coercion will go a long way in building up confidence 
among people. Surprisingly, the confrontation between the state 
apparatus and the militants have sidelined the people of the area. 
The worst part of it that it has become difficult to draw a line 
between the atrocities committed by the security force and by the 
militant outfits. The Amnesty International in its various reports 
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lament on the flagrant violation of human rights by the 
military,para-military and the police forces. The very fact that the 
state Government sometime back, denied permission to the 
Amnesty International to visit the State implies that it has 
something to hide. A country is judged not by what its people say 
about it but by what others talk about it. 
The crisis in Kashmir should not be seen in isolation. The 
increased role of Pakistan in recent years and its support to the 
militants, financial, moral, religious and supply of arms and 
ammunitions have kept the problem alive and active. It is rather 
rediculous and oversimplification to think that the militants are not 
aided by Pakistan. The frustration of the people with the State and 
the Union Governments has made the task of Pakistan easier to fish 
in the troubled waters. It is therefore, necessary, to set our own 
house in order, before doing any thing else. Article 370 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees autonomy to the state, over the 
years, has became almost a dead letter. The frequent talk about its 
deletion has created further misgivings and fears among people 
about the real intentions of the Union Government. This is 
understandable with BJP at the helm of affairs. 
Ruthless suppression of militants is often voiced in some 
quarters to curb and eradicate militancy on the lines of Punjab. 
However, it is doubtful whether such a strategy would work in the 
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Kashmir valley. Demographically the State of Punjab is not entirely 
Sikh dominated while Kashmir is predominantly a Muslim 
dominated area. Use of force is bound to be dubbed as 
discriminatary and anti-minority, inviting the wrath of human rights 
activists. Moreover, despite the patronage of some of the Sikh 
terrorist groups by Pakistan, it never laid claims over the State of 
Punjab. Kashmir, on the contrary, has been the bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan since partition. Therefore, the problem 
of Kashmir is totally different from Punjab or for that matter, the 
North Eastern area, where the insurgent movements were put down 
successfully extending over a long period of time. With China 
stopping aid to these insurgents, the task of Government of India 
became easier. This is not the case with Kashmir, Pakistan is always 
prepared to provide the infra and supra structure to sustain 
militancy. The State of Punjab and the North-Eastem States were 
not disputed territories and the feeding by the foreign powers to the 
insurgent movements were only peripheral. Despite remote 
connections of these movements with foreign powers, the problem 
was basically internal. Kashmir, being a bilateral issue has drawn 
world wide attention. It has both national and international 
ramifications, the solution of which is not easy. Concerted efforts 
are called for resolving the dispute. There is also a suggestion in 
some quarters that the Kashmir valley should be conceeded to 
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Pakistan and India should retain Jammu, Kargil and Leh. It seems 
to be rather impracticable to accept such a proposition after 50 
years of partition. It will not only demoralise the defence and para-
military forces but can also provide a boost to the aggressive 
designs of Pakistan. Even if it is accepted for arguments sake, it 
may not find favour with some of the political parties like the JKLF 
who still clamour for a unified and independent Kashmir. Joint 
control of Kashmir by India and Pakistan is also bandied about. 
Such a situation is bound to create more complications, political, 
diplomatic, economic and administrative. It will not be possible to 
distribute powers and locate responsibility and conflicts are bound 
to arise over defence, foreign affairs, internal security, finance etc. 
etc. The remedy will prove worst than the melady. The experience 
of the Interim Government and the rift between the Congress and 
the Muslim League over sharing of portfolios will reappear again. 
An independent Kashmir also is an unworkable and impractical 
proposition. And it is too late to hold a plebiscite. The only option 
left is to create confidence among the inhabitants of the valley by 
involving them in the political, economic and cultural processes. 
To start with, Goodwill committees be set up all over the 
State, which should convince the people that Kashmir is not an 
island, it is as much a part of India as other States and that, on the 
contrary, it has a special status under Article 370, which will not be 
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twisted or diluted to the satisfaction of the Sangh Parivar. And it is 
equally necessary for the disgruntled elements in the valley to 
reciprocate the gesture by not looking to Pakistan or other countries 
for help and assistance. For Pakistan, is no friend of theirs. The 
leadership in Pakistan, be it civilian or military thrives on Kashmir 
crisis. Any lasting solution of the Kashmir problem will be a 
political disaster and collapse of diplomacy for Pakistan. Despite 
the loud proclamations of the Pakistan leadership for a dialogue 
with India for the peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, it is 
difficult to believe its sincerity. It is this predicament that has 
blocked all efforts of peace in the valley. The economic scenario 
and the employment avenues are far from satisfactory. A decade of 
violence and terrorism has crippled the State's economy. The need 
of the hour is to reconstruct the economy and generate employment 
opportunities to liberate the masses from the shackles of poverty. It 
is necessary to keep the people busy to prevent revolutions for an 
empty mind is a devil's workshop. Once the people are engaged in 
the economic pursuits, they will not be carried away by the 
religious rhetoric . Funds should be made available for the 
establishment of small-scale and cottage industries. The carpet 
industry, which has suffered a setback all these years of turmoil, 
should be revived and rebuilt. The Tourism industry has been in 
doldrums since past one decade. Peace and security are necessary 
to attract tourists. 
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A consensus among various political parties and groups 
on the basic problems of the Kashmir crisis is called for. The 
politics of convenience and manipulations must go. The old guards 
have failed miserably to provide the lead. A new leadership with a 
band of sincere and dedicated workers seems to be an imperative. 
This calls for fair and free elections as far as possible. The reports 
on the past elections in the valley is a pathetic commentary on 
democracy in India. It is, therefore, necessary to hold elections 
under the supervision of the National Human Rights Commission, 
NGO, intellectuals and the press. There is also a need to improve 
the human rights situation. Reports of misuse and abuse of powers 
by the security forces are not totally unfounded. A restraint on the 
part of these forces, respecting the elementary right to life, is of 
paramount importance. State terrorism is no answer to terrorism. 
Kashmir, known for its long traditions of religious 
tolerance and pluralism right from the times of Syed Ali Hamdani 
and Sheikh Noor-ud-din in the 14th century, presents a totally 
different picture today. Gone are the days when W. Lawrence 
referred to the 'delightful tolerance' which existed between Muslims 
and Hindus. Today secularism lies in tatters. Militancy and 
terrorism have made a sizeable population of the valley to abandon 
their homes. It is important for the militant gorups to make serious 
efforts (the State should also join them) to bring them back to their 
homeland; for the moral legitimacy of their movement depends on 
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pluralism in Kashmir. The conflict can be solved only through 
meaningful dialogue. It is often suggested that a change in the 
demographic profile of the State, meaning thereby that more and 
more Hindus should be persuaded to move into the valley to restore 
back the secular culture. But much water has flowed since 1947 
and the chasm between the two communities have become more 
and more wide. Only a Herculean task can bring back the priestine 
glory to the valley, which judging from the performance of the 
Government, seems to be a distant dream. It would be more proper 
if this move is initiated by the Government with the help of 
prominent Muslim leaders, who still retain credibility in the public. 
Such a step would surely generate an atmosphere of peace and 
goodwill, which is awfully lacking at the moment. 
It is time for all, the Union and State Governments, the 
Hurriyat Conference, other militant outfits, intellectuals and above 
all Pakistan, to sit together and do some serious business. The 
solution does not lie in Jihad. Religion nd politics should not be 
allowed to hamper peace process. The Prime Minister's, declaration 
of a ceasefire is a welcome gesture which needs to carried forward. 
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APPENDIX-I 
Militant Organisations I Identified by US State Department 
Responsible for Various Hijackings in the World. (1998) 
1. Abu-Nidal Organization (ANO) 
2. Palestine Liberation Front 
3. Aum Supreme Truth (AUM): Aum Shinrikyo 
4. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
5. South Mollucean Terrorists 
6. Harkat-ul-Mujahedin(HUM) 
7. Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
8. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
9. Armed Islamic Group (AIG) 
10. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
11. Sikh Terrorist Groups 
12. Jammu and kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
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APPENDIX II 
Details of the Thirteen Indian Airlines Planes Hijacked 
Between 19714& 1999. 
January 30,1971: Two armed men diverted a Fokker Friendship aircraft 
to Lahore when it took off from Srinagar. The plane was blown up three 
days later on Feruary 2 after the release of all 30 passangers and four 
crew members. 
Sept. 18, 1976 : A Delhi Bombay flight via Jaipur, with 77 passengers 
and seven crew members, was forcibly taken to Lahore. After 
negotiations, the leader of the hijackers was persuaded to leave the aircraft 
and his five associates were overpowered in a raid. 
December 20, 1979 : A Delhi bound Boing 737 from Lucknow was 
hijacked to Varanasi by two men, Davendra Kumar Pandey and Bhola 
Nath Pandey, weilding guns, they were both taken into custody. 
September 29, 1978 : Five Khalistani activists diverted a Boeing 737, 
going to Srinagar from Delhi, at Lahore. Pakistani Commanders, dressed 
as cleaners, overpowered them and freed the passengers two hours before 
the deadline set by the hijackers for the release of Jarnail Singh 
Bhindrawale and a ransom of half a million dollars along with asylum in 
Pakistan. 
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August 4,1982: A Delhi Srinagar flight was hijacked by Mohinder Singh 
and was being taken to Lahore. But due to refusal of permission to land 
in Lahore, the flight landed in Amritsar. 
Aug. 20, 1982 : A Boeing 737 hopping flight, Udaipur-Jodhpur-Delhi, 
with 63 passengers and six crew members was hijacked to Lahore. This 
flight too was refused permission to land in Lahore due to which the 
hijackers were forced to land in Amritsar. The sixth Hijacker Manjeet 
Singh was shot dead in a commado action at the airport in Amritsar. 
Aug. 24, 1984 : Six crew members and 87 passengers were on board IC-
421 that was diverted after it took off from Chandhigarh. The plane was 
first taken to Lahore, then to Karachi and latter to Dubai, where all the 
passengers were released and brought back by a rehef plane the next day. 
Jan. 22, 1993 : A Patna Lucknow-Delhi flight was hijacked shortly after 
it took off from Lucknow by Satish Chandra Pandey who later 
surrendered at the instance of Atal Behari Vajpayee. 
March 27,1993 : Airbus IC-439 was diverted by Hari Singh while on a 
Hyderabad-Lucknow-DeUii flight. It later landed in Amritsar. 
April 10, 1993 : A Delhi bound plane from Lucknow was hijacked by 
four students with 59 people on board. The 135 minute drama ended 
with passengers overpowering them. 
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*. April 24,1993 : The IC-427 Delhi Srinagar flight was hijacked by a lone 
Hijacker with 141 passengers on board. It landed in Amritsar and the 
passengers were saved by NSG commanders who stormed the plane and 
overpowered the hijackers. 
*. Dec. 24, 1999 : The flight from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked to 
Lahore where permission to land was not granted. The flight later landed 
in Rajasani airport, Amritsar. In Amritsar after refueling the plane, the 
hijackers tried to land in Opla (Lahore) but they were not granted 
permission by the authorities there. However, at India's request, the 
aircraft was refuelled at Lahore and it took off from Lahore to Kabul. 
Kabul again refused landing and they fmally landed in Dubai. The 
Hijackers, here released 27 hostages and the dead body of Rupin Katyal 
who refused to follow their diktats. Later, the hijackers took the plane to 
Khandhar, Afghanistan, where they fmally made known their demand. 
However, the eight day hijacking crisis came to an end on Dec. 31, when 
all the 155 hostages aboard the Indian Airlines aircraft returned to Delhi 
after being freed by Hijackers in exchange of three hardcore militants 
namely Ahmed Umer,Syeed Sheikh (a British national of Pakistan origin), 
Mohammad Masood, Azhar and Mustaq Ahmad Zargar alias Mustaq 
Latram, the most Prominent Kashmiri militant, heading the new defunct 
Al-Umar Mujahideen. 
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July 5,1984: An Airbus, carrying 255 passengers and nine crew members 
from Srinagar to Delhi, was hijacked to Lahore by nine Sikh militants of 
the Bhindrannwala group. The Hijackers who demanded $ 25 million and 
the release of 22 terrorists, threatened to blow up the plane if their 
demands were not met within six hours. They siurundered the next day. 
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APPENDIX VI 
The Instrument of Accession of Jammu 
and Kashmir State(October 26, 1947). 
Whereas, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from 
the fifteenth day of August 1947, there shall be set up an independent 
Dominion known as India, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, 
with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor 
General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of India; 
And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by 
the Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the 
dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler 
thereof; 
Now, therefore, 
I, Shriman Inder Mahandar Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari 
Singhji, Jammu Kashmir Narash Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhi Pathi, Ruler of 
Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my 
said State Do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and 
1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the iutent 
that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the 
Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for 
purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of 
Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the 
purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as " this State ") such 
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functions as may be vested in them by or mider the Government of 
India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15* day 
of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereafter referred to as 
"the Act"). 
2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to 
the provisions of the Act within this State so for as they are appUcable 
therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession. 
3. I accept the matters specified in the schedule hereto as the matters 
with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for 
the State. 
4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance 
that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the 
Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the 
administration in the State of any law of the Dominion legislature 
shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement 
shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed 
and have effect accordingly. 
5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by 
any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, 
unless shall amendment is accepted by me by [in] an Instrument 
supplementary to this Instrument. 
6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature 
to Make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition 
of land for any purpose, but 1 hereby undertake that should the 
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Dominion for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in the 
State deemed necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request 
acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer 
it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, 
determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of 
India. 
7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way 
to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my 
discretion to enter into arrangements with the Govenmient of India 
under any such future constitution. 
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty 
in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, 
the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me 
as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in 
this State. 
9. 1 hereby declare that 1 execute this Instrument on behalf of this State 
and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the 
State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and 
successors. 
Given under my hand this twenty - sixth day of October, Nineteen hundred 
and forty-seven. 
HARI SINGH 
Maharajadhiraj of Jammu and Kashmir State. 
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APPENDIX-VII 
Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948 
The Security council, 
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India 
concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir; 
Having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint 
and the reply and couter complaints of the representative of Pakistan; 
Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in 
Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their 
utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting; 
Nothing with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the 
question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be 
decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; 
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger 
international peace and security; 
Reaffirms the Council's resolution of 17 January; 
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the 
resolution of the Council of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and 
shall include in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, 
representatives of and that if the membership of the Commission has 
not been completed within ten days from the date of adoption of this resolution 
the President of the Council may designate such other Member or Members 
of the United Nations as are requered to complete the membership of five; 
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian 
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Subcontinent and there place its good office and mediation at the diposal of 
the Government of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking 
of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and 
order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in 
cooperation with one another and with the Commission and further instructs 
the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the 
resolution and to this end; 
Recommends to the Government of India and Pakistan the following 
measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to 
bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a 
free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. 
A. Restorntion of Peace and Order 
1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best 
endeavours: 
(a) To secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of 
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who entered 
the state for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion in to the 
state of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in 
the state. 
(b)To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in 
this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the 
state; regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express thier views and to vote 
on the question of the accession of the state, and that therefore they should 
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cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order. 
2. The Government of hidia should: 
(a) when it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set 
up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the 
tribesmen are withdrawing and that the arrangements for the cessation of 
the fighting have become effective. Put into opperation in consultation with 
the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and 
Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required 
for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of the law and order: 
(b) make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and 
announce the completion of each stage: 
(c) when the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum 
strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission 
for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance 
with the following principles: 
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or 
appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the state; 
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward 
areas; 
(iii) That any reserve of troops wich may be included in the total 
strength should be located within thier present base area. 
3. The Government of India should agree that untill such time as the 
Plebiscite Administration referred to below fmds it necessary to exersice 
the power of direction and supervision over the state forces and police 
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provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in the areas to agreed upon by 
the Plebiscite Administrator. 
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into 
operation personnel recruted locally in each district should so for as possible 
be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with 
due regard to the protection of minorites, subject to such additional 
requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred 
to in paragraph 7. 
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the 
Commission subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and 
the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces either 
Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification. 
B. Plebiscite 
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the 
Government of the state invite the measure political groups to designate 
responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of 
the administration at the Ministerial level, while the Plebiscite is being 
prepared carried out. 
7. The Government of India should undertake that there should be 
established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a 
Plebiscite as soon as possible on the quesion of the accession of the state to 
India or Pakistan. 
8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be 
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delegated by the state to Plebiscite Administration such powers as the later 
considers neccessary for that holding a fair and impartial Plebiscite including 
for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the state forces and 
pohce. 
9. The Government of India at the request of the Plebiscite 
Administration make available from Indian forces such assistance as the 
Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions. 
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite 
Administrator; 
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as the officer of the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir should have authority to nominate his assistants and 
other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. Such 
nominees should be formally and draft regulations should be formaly 
promulgated by the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government 
of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fiiUy qualified persons nominated by 
the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the state 
judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite 
Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct 
of a free and impartial plebiscite; 
(d) The terms of the service of the Administrator should form the 
subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary General of the United 
Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms 
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of service for his assistants and subordinates; 
(e) The Administrator should have a right to communicate directly 
with the Government of the state and with the commission of the Security 
Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the 
Government of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the 
Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all the 
forgoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arrising 
which may tend in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite. 
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give 
full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, 
coercion, or intimidiation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in 
the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publically announce and 
should cause the Government obligation bringing on all public authorities 
and officials in Jammu and Kashmir. 
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the 
Government of the state declare and make known that all subject of the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste, or party, will be safe and 
free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession 
of the state and there will be freedom of press, speech and assembly and 
freedom of travel in the state, including freedom of lawful entry and exit. 
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the 
Government of the state also use their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal 
from the state of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally 
resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it for lawful 
purpose. 
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APPENDIX Vra 
Article 370 Of the Indian Constitution 
(1950) 
370' (Temporary provision with respect to the State of Jairnnu and 
Kashmir) 
(I) Not withstanding anything in this Constitution, 
(a) the provision of article 23 8 shall not apply in relation to the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir; 
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be 
limited to -
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in 
consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the 
President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of 
Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of 
India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature 
may make laws for that State; and 
(ii) Such other matters in the said Lists, as, with the concurrence of the 
Government of the State, the President may by order specify. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State 
In exercise of the powers conferred by this article the President, on the recommendation 
of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that, as from 
the 17* day of November, 1952, the said art. 3 70 shall be operative with the modification 
that for the explanation cl.(l) thereof, the following Explanation is submitted namely: 
"Explanation : For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means the 
person for that time being recognised by the president on the recommendation of the 
Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-1-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting 
on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the state for the time being in office." 
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means the person for the time being recognized by the President as the 
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation 
dated the fifth day of March, 1948; 
c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to 
that State; 
d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation 
to that State subject to such exceptions and modification as the 
President may by order^  specify: 
Provided that no such order which relates to the matter specified in 
the histrument of accession of the state referred to in paragraph (i) 
of sub-clause (e) shall be issued except in consultation with the 
Government of the state: 
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other 
than those referred in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except 
with the concurrence of that Government. 
2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in 
paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (I) or in the second proviso 
to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent 
Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is 
convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision 
as it may take thereon. 
3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provision of this article, 
See the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (CO. 48) as 
amended from lime to lime in Appendi.\ I [ of the Indian Constitution] 
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14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of 
the state release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that: 
(a) All citizens of the state who have left it on account of disturbances 
are invited and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise rights as 
such citizens; 
(b) There is no victimization; 
(c) Minorities in all parts of the state are accorded adequate 
protection. 
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the 
plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been 
really free and impartial. 
C. General provisions 
16. The Government of India and Pakistan should each be invited to 
nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such 
assistance as it may require in the performance of its task. 
17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such 
observers as it may require in the performance of its task. 
18. The Security Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to 
it therein. 
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the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall 
cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions 
and modifications and from such date as he may specify: 
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State 
referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before tiie President issues such 
a notification. 
APPENDIX IX 
The Tashkent Agreement (January 10, 1966) 
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having 
met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India 
and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peacefiil 
relations between their countries and to promote understanding and fiiendly 
relations between their peoples.T hey consider the attainment of these 
objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 miUion people of 
bidia and Pakistan. 
(1) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree 
that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations 
between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to 
force and to settle their disputes through peacefiil means. They considered 
that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-
Pakistani sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India 
and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between 
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the two coimtries. It was against this background that Jairmiu& Kashmir 
was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position. 
TROOPS WITHDRAWAL 
(II) The Prime Minister oflndia and the President ofPakistan have agreed 
that all armed personnel of the two countries shall withdrawn not later 
than February 25, 1966, to the position they held prior to August 5, 
1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms of the cease-fire 
line. 
(III) The Prime Minister oflndia and the President ofPakistan have agreed 
that relations between bidia and Pakistan shall he based on the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
(IV) The Prime Minister of hidia and the President ofPakistan have agreed 
that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other 
country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development 
of friendly relations between the two countries. 
(V ) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have the 
High Commissioner oflndia to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of 
Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning 
of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both 
Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on 
diplomatic intercourse. 
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TRADE RELAnONS 
(VI) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade 
relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India 
and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements 
between India and Pakistan. 
(VII) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the 
repatriation of the prisoners of war. 
(VIII) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that both sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the 
problems of refugees and eviction of illegal immigration. They also 
agreed that both sides will create conditions which prevent the exodus 
of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and 
assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict. 
SOVIET LEADERS THANKED 
(IX) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed 
that both sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other 
levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have 
recognized the need to set up joint Indo Pakistan bodies which will report 
to their Goverrmients in order to decide what further steps should be 
taken. 
(X) The Prime Minister of India and President Pakistan record their feelings 
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of deep appreciations and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, 
the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in 
bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually 
satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly 
people Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming 
reception and generous hospitality. They invite the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this declaration. 
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APPENDIX X 
The Simla Agreement (July 2, 1972) 
The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India resolved 
that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have 
hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and 
harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the 
subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources 
and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples. 
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of Pakistan and 
the Government of India have agreed as follows: 
i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations 
shall govern the relations between the two countries; 
ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by 
peacefiil means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful 
means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final 
settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither 
side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent 
organization, assistance and encouragement of any acts detrimental 
to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations; 
iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and 
durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries 
to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit; 
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iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the 
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be 
resolved by peaceful means; 
v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial 
integrity, political independence and sovereign equality; 
vi) That in accordance with the charter of the United Nations they will 
refrain from the threat or use offeree against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of each other. 
Both Governments will take all steps within power to prevent hostile 
propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage 
the dissemination of such information as would promote the 
development of friendly relations between them. 
In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between 
the two countries step by step, it was agreed that: 
i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, 
sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights, 
ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the 
nationals of the other country, 
iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be 
resumed as far as possible, 
iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. 
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from 
time to time to work out the necessary details. 
In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both 
the Govermnents agree that: 
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i) Pakistani and Indian forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the 
international border 
ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-
fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by botli sides without 
prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall 
seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and 
legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from 
threat or the use offeree in violation of this Line. 
iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this 
agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof 
This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in 
accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come 
into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification 
are exchanged. 
Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again 
at a mutually convenient time in the ftiture and that, in the meanwhile, the 
representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss fiirther the modalities 
and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalsation 
of relations, including the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and 
civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the 
resumption of diplomatic relations. 
ZuLFiKAR A u BHUTTO 
President, Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
INDIRA GANDHI 
Prime Minister, Republic of India 
Simla, the Z"** July, 1972. 
